Quantum Tech at China’s Two Sessions 2025
Where was quantum in the political spectacle?
The Two Sessions, highly publicised yearly gatherings of the NPC (legislative body) and CPPCC (advisory body), just concluded in Beijing. What appearances did quantum make in the political spectacle? Here, we look at quantum technologies in the Government Work Report and the Two Sessions’ press conferences. Also covered: Which are the 16 provinces that mentioned quantum in their local work reports? What did Guo Guoping, co-founder of the startup Origin Quantum, say at the sidelines of the summit?
Science and tech innovation take centerstage
Xi Jinping pointed out that scientific and technological innovation and industrial innovation are the basic paths for the development of new quality productive forces.
(Xi Jinping during the Two Sessions at deliberations of the Jiangsu delegation.)
S&T innovation was prominent at the two sessions. The ten tasks for 2025 in the Government Work Report list new quality productive forces (NQPF)1 at second place, and “rejuvenating the country through science and education, and improving the overall efficiency of the national innovation system” at third place. (First is boosting consumption.)
Even the econ-themed press conference was dominated by tech, including the announcement of a national-level venture capital guidance fund. While few details have been given so far, the 138 billion USD initiative set to operate for 20 years explicitly mentions quantum technologies alongside other “frontier fields” such as AI and hydrogen technology and “emerging industries” such as bio-manufacturing, embodied AI, and 6G.
Besides the national VC fund, I found it interesting that the econ presser mentioned quantum in the context of China’s foreign trade: “[...] China's export products are more scientific and technological [...] China's rapid development of science and technology, including artificial intelligence, quantum technology, cloud computing, etc., is creating a new paradigm of trade in services.” Personally, I think that the (upcoming) export of S&T (services) from China, especially to BRI/“non-Western” countries, is often overlooked, definitely in a field like quantum tech. As foreign export controls and local policy incentives lead to the domestic development of quantum hardware components (lasers, dilution fridges, control equipment …) and software/cloud ecosystems, the attempts of these companies to go global will be interesting in the next years.
The Two Sessions were also accompanied by publicity around Zu Chongzhi No. 3, a superconducting quantum computing prototype by Zhu Xiaobo’s group at USTC, said to be on par with Google’s Willow chip but so far without comparable error correction breakthrough. (The arXiv preprint detailing Zu Chongzhi No. 3 has been online since December 2024, but like Google’s Willow, most of the media attention only came with the peer-reviewed publication.)
Quantum mentioned twice in the Government Work Report
Quantum technology appeared twice in the Government Work Report:
The first mention was self-congratulatory, looking back to 2024 under the bullet “The pace of "progress" is solid and powerful” (“进”的步伐坚实有力): “The innovation ability has been improved, and new achievements have been made in the fields of integrated circuits, artificial intelligence, and quantum technology.”
The second was as a task ahead for developing new quality productive forces (NQPF): “Establish a mechanism for the growth of future industrial investment, and cultivate future industries such as biomanufacturing, quantum technology, embodied intelligence, and 6G.”
The other fields mentioned alongside quantum are interesting: A rather small number of high-priority areas (AI and integrated circuits) and “future industries” (biomanufacturing, embodied intelligence and 6G). On the other hand, quantum is not mentioned in the same sentence as “emerging industries such as commercial aerospace and low-altitude economy.” To have a reference, CTRL+F for 人工智能 (AI) brought up three results, for 集成电路 (integrated circuits), only one.
I found the mentioning under NQPF interesting, as the same paragraph calls for pilot projects of “integrated development of advanced manufacturing and modern service industry,” an acceleration in the development of national high-tech zones, and the promotion of specialized SMEs as well as unicorns and gazelles2.
Expect quantum industry collaborative innovation alliances (产业协同创新联盟), quantum high-tech zones, and quantum venture parks and funds? Indeed, in Beijing, a “Zhongguancun Quantum Information Industry Alliance” was announced recently in October 2024, alongside the unveiling of “the country's first quantum incubator, the Zhongguancun Quantum Incubator, and the Zhongguancun (Haidian) Quantum Technology Future Industrial Park.”
Going by the local work reports at the two sessions, some of these structures will likely be replicated across the country:
16 provinces mention quantum in their work reports
According to QuantumChina (光子盒), 16 provincial-level divisions explicitly mentioned quantum in their work reports. These give high-level updates on quantum centers, research projects, and plans towards building quantum industrial chains. For example:
Anhui (→ Hefei), one of the most important provinces for quantum in China, will make every effort to promote the construction of three “major S&T innovation leading highland areas” (quantum information, nuclear fusion, and deep space) and accelerate the construction of quantum technology and industry centers. The province also aims to accelerate technological breakthroughs and industrialization in the fields of quantum tech, synthetic biology, and space-ground integrated communications.
Zhejiang (→ Hangzhou) aims to accelerate the layout of new industries and business formats such as humanoid robots, quantum information, [...].
Shanghai mentions quantum computing among the strategic frontier areas to focus on and highlights driving research layout.
Guangdong highlights quantum as a future industry and plans for a “national new industrialization demonstration zone.”
Jiangsu (→ Nanjing, Suzhou) explores establishing a “new mechanism for growth in future industry investment” and wants to construct a “10+X future industry system”. Of course, quantum tech is one of the “10 key industries” (while the “+X” represents flexibility and adaptability).
Shandong (→ Jinan) highlights the Jinan Quantum Technology park and wants to build “future industry pilot zones with high standards.”
Even among the less well-known quantum localities:
Hunan mentions quantum as a future industry and specifically highlights a research project on quantum gravity measurement at the Changsha Quantum Institute. The province also aims to promote collaboration between “large universities, large research institutes, and large enterprises.”
Sichuan, Henan, Hubei, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and even Gansu all highlight quantum among a handful of examples for future industries. (Hainan furthermore reported progress on a quantum project.)
Some thoughts:
These high-level reports take a systemic and integrative view. Rather than individually emphasizing support for fundamental or applied research, start-ups or mature companies, all of them are morphed together in broad statements about innovation carriers (“S&T innovation leading highland areas”, “quantum technology and industry centers”, “layout of new industries” or “demonstration/pilot zones”). I guess this integration is in the spirit of NQPF.
The persistent mentioning of quantum as a “future industry” among a handful of other technologies feels like checking boxes. For some of the provinces mentioned, I can’t quite take it seriously (while at the same time, some relevant localities such as Beijing and, to a lesser extent, Tianjin and Chongqing, are not featured in the list above). Future industries (未来产业) were first mentioned by Xi Jinping in 2020, and since then, quantum has had multiple related mentions in high-level policy documents. Given the proliferation of quantum in local work reports, it seems that the memo has arrived with local leaders.
In the local work reports, quantum is mentioned alongside a wider range of technologies than in the national work report, including again AI, embodied intelligence, 6G, and biotech, but also new energy, nuclear technologies, robotics and space (amongst others).
Besides official work reports, the Two Sessions also featured representatives with links to the quantum industry among the deputies to the NPC:
Ma Xinqiang: We should build a national lab for optoelectronics in Wuhan
Ma Xinqiang is chairman of HGTECH, a laser company.
At the Two Sessions, Ma submitted a proposal to support the construction of a national laboratory in optoelectronics and information in the Wuhan Optics Valley (one of China’s first high-tech zones, which since 2022 hosts the Wuhan Institute of Quantum Technology). This would be significant, as my understanding is that among the zoo of designations–various state key labs, research centers etc.–the national laboratory (国家实验室) designation is at the very top, with only a single-digit or maybe low double-digit number in all of China. Currently, Wuhan already hosts a national research center (国家研究中心) in optoelectronics (without the “and information”), the second highest designation (I think).
Guo Guoping: We need more talents and government support for an independent quantum computer manufacturing chain
Guo Guoping, a USTC Professor, is the (deputy) director of two quantum centers in Hefei, as well as co-founder, chief scientist and largest shareholder at Origin Quantum (which is one of China’s largest and most mediatized quantum start-ups).
In an interview at the Two Sessions, he said “China's quantum computing industry chain is still immature, and there are problems such as lack of raw material suppliers and limited generalized processing capacity of equipment, resulting in high production costs and unstable quality of quantum computers.” He also advocates for international cooperation and for Chinese quantum companies to go abroad. I found these statements interesting as they are more humble and less combative than some of the reporting I have seen about Origin Quantum.
Guo also highlighted that there is “a shortage of quantum computing talents in China, and the contradiction between supply and demand is prominent." He claimed that according to industry statistics, China has only around 1’000 professionals in the field of quantum computing, resulting in a job gap of tens of thousands in the relevant upstream and downstream enterprises. He called for more quantum computing majors, including in vocational colleges, which “can align their programs with the engineering and industrial development needs of the quantum computing industry.”
In summary, quite a few (more than your author expected) interesting quantum news came out of the recently concluded Two Sessions: Direct mentions in both local and central work reports in the context of new quality productive forces, a national level VC fund for tech, and statements by delegates from China’s quantum industry.
This is the first post of maybe many from the China ∩ Quantum Substack. Quantum tech in China; what happens where, how does it affect, and is affected by, international developments? Mostly from an S&T innovation policy angle, future posts may also include technical deepdives.
A tifa (提法) that roughly refers to S&T innovation integrated with the “real” economy, e.g. by modernizing existing industries or creating new industries and business models on the back of emerging technologies.