Featured CASS Article: US competition with China in Quantum Information Technology
America's "competitive anxiety", the international "containment network" against China, and challenges to longterm US leadership
An interesting Chinese article came out recently (April 2025) in the Chinese journal “Contemporary American Review.” It’s written by a YU Feng of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)1, titled “Quantum Rivalry: U.S. Competition with China in the Field of Quantum Information Technologies.”
I summarise and discuss it below. I found the framing, the discussion about the impact of US controls on China (section (3)) and the challenges to future US leadership in quantum (section (4)) highly relevant.
First, disclaimers:
The article extensively cites English sources; in fact, a Xinhua readout on the 2020 Politburo session on quantum is the only Chinese source! I think this may partly be because it was published in an American Studies journal, and partly editorial policy/self-censoring to avoid sharing any Chinese content that could be considered sensitive. The article talks a lot about US initiatives, restrictions and wider motivations. It does make some very relevant points in this regard, and, given the well-regarded journal and affiliation, I would hope that it is representative of Chinese analysts’ framing/perspective on US actions.
The piece also includes interesting bits about quantum in China—especially the effect of the US’ “containment network”—, but without sources and with less detail than discussions on the US.
Quotes are machine-translated; I take no responsibility for accuracy.
Here we go; everything in regular font attempts to accurately represent the views of the article, while my own takes and interpretations are in italic.
(1) Why the quantum competition?
Three main reasons for US-China competition in quantum information technology:
The strategic value of quantum information technology: “[…] will greatly promote economic transformation and industrial upgrading, and have an impact on national military and information security.”
The typical: Big future market for quantum computing, quantum sensing already commercially available with many military implications, quantum communications with QKD2 and QRNG3 in “commercial preparation stage.”
Quantum computing poses a severe challenge to traditional information security, and “quantum communication, as a ‘shield’ for information security, can effectively counter the ‘spear’ of quantum computing.” This would be less common to read in the US, where the focus is more on PQC4. In fact, PQC is only mentioned once in the article in the context of incompatibilities between the US and its allies (see discussion at the end of section (4)).
Strategic competition (between the US and China since 2017, but also more broadly in quantum with many government initiatives globally) and efforts by the US to decouple from China in the digital economy
US’ competitive anxiety (竞争焦虑) about Chinese progress: “China's continuous improvement in this field and the Chinese government's high attention and systematic layout of quantum technology have aroused deep concerns in the United States, prompting it to intensify competition with China in order to maintain its own technological leadership.”
This has been deepened by:
Increasing practical application of quantum, e.g. “critical turning point in realising application, and the era of uncertainty in quantum computing has ended.” (Although the author acknowledges that “industry estimates that it will take another 10 to 15 years to produce a quantum computer that can solve various problems.”)
“[…] China's growing strength in quantum technology has deepened the United States' sense of crisis.” China is globally the only country that can challenge the US. The author highlights breakthroughs in the generation of cluster states on a photonic quantum chip (Feb. 2025) and the Zu Chongzhi III supercomputing chip (March 2025). (Dates refer to publication in peer-reviewed journals)
“[…] Chinese government's strategic determination to seize the commanding heights of science and technology […]” The author references the 2020 Politburo study session on quantum, quantum as key technology (关键技术) in 14th Five-Year Plan and its appearance in many other policy documents, and the March 2025 announcement of a large VC guidance fund (for quantum, AI and other fields).
US reservations about China’s approach to technology development: “[the US] slanders (污蔑) China for investing a lot of resources in seeking global technological leadership through ‘authoritarian’ means such as stealing technology, forcing companies to disclose intellectual property rights, and disrupting free and fair markets […]”
(2) What has the US done so far?
No one strategic document on quantum competition, but the National Security Strategies of 2017 and 2022 and the National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies of 2020 outline the US view:
2017: China is declared a “strategic competitor”
2020: “[…] U.S. government’s list of critical emerging technologies, claiming that ‘the United States’ leadership in science and technology faces challenges from strategic competitors […]”
2022: “[…] proposed that China is a “systemic competitor” of the United States, and that ‘technology is at the core of today’s geopolitical competition and at the core of the United States’ security, economy, and democratic future’ […]”, quantum among a range of fields singled out for US leadership and deeper cooperation with allies.
What the US is doing to win the competition:
Blockade (or containment network, 包围网): “In general, the United States' quantum competition policy toward China is mainly aimed at curbing China's key technology development and adopts strong blockade measures.”
Export controls and entity listings
“[…] various measures to restrict Chinese quantum companies and research institutions from cooperating with relevant American and even international institutions.” This is followed by a few interesting remarks (without citation): “As early as the end of 2022, IBM had already refused Chinese IP access to its cloud-based quantum computing platform (IBM Quantum Exploration), which directly resulted in Chinese researchers being unable to use IBM quantum computers for scientific research experiments. In addition, the US government has also restricted academic exchanges between China and the United States through visa restrictions (increasing the rejection rate and delaying the processing of visa applications).”
Working with allies to build a “de-Sinicized” quantum supply chain “to ensure that key components such as quantum computing chips, cryogenic cooling systems, and high-end photonic materials do not flow to China.”
“Whole-of-government” approach (this is indeed the official wording at the NQI) to promote quantum in the US, cooperation between academia, industry and government. Main initiatives: National Quantum Initiative Act (NQIA), CHIPS and Science Act
“Strengthening quantum technology cooperation among allies and building a global strategic alliance” based on national security, values, and a common economic vision (referring to Biden-era documents, now less clear, see section (4) below).
Bilateral joint statements, AUKUS Quantum Arrangement
Leading role in international standardisation, especially the ISO/IEC JTC 3-Quantum Technologies committee: “[…] the United States and its allies are leading the discussion on quantum technology standards in the International Organisation for Standardisation, making early arrangements to gain the right to speak and formulate quantum technology standards.” The piece is relatively tame here. For more direct (Western) criticism of US political intervention in quantum standards to sideline China, see this commentary.
Global networks by US companies (e.g. IBM) and research institutes
(3) What is the impact on China’s quantum ecosystem?
Overall, the effects of US efforts on China have been a mix of short-term hindrances and a long-term acceleration of China's push for self-reliance.
Negative impacts:
Export controls have had an impact: Supply chain disruption, difficulties in obtaining core technologies, adding challenges to quantum hardware R&D, and impacting talent training
US controls related to advanced chips and their manufacturing equipment are highlighted as particularly disruptive. “Since semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced chips are upstream products of the quantum information technology industry chain and are the basic hardware for the development of quantum information technology, restricting the export of these products will largely restrict China's technological breakthroughs.” I find this interesting, as discussions of chips controls usually center around AI. But indeed, not just silicon-based quantum computing, but also superconducting quantum computing (among the most popular and most advanced approaches) relies critically on semiconductor manufacturing processes, including lithography. The restriction of advanced Nvidia GPUs was also mentioned as relevant to quantum computing. I assume the author sees the relevance either in classical simulation of quantum computers (using GPUs) or in classical-quantum integrations (with fast classical operations required for quantum error correction, for example).
Entity listings constrained hardware iteration: “After QuantumCTek and Origin Quantum were sanctioned by the United States, it has been difficult [for them] to obtain advanced superconducting chip manufacturing technology, which has constrained the iteration and update of quantum computing hardware.”
Impact on talent training from quantum computing export controls: “[…] the US restriction on the export of quantum computing prototypes has hindered the training of students in the field of quantum information science in Chinese universities.” This one is quite interesting. I assume it refers to platforms like this one from Infleqtion: a turnkey quantum computing prototype that can be used to train students with cold-atom experiments. I am not an experimentalist, but I assume that building and calibrating a setup like that from scratch could easily take a year and doesn’t scale well for training purposes.
Isolation of China from quantum technology cooperation and exchanges:
“As early as the end of 2022, IBM had already denied Chinese IP access to its cloud-based quantum computing platform (IBM Quantum Experience), which directly resulted in Chinese researchers being unable to use IBM quantum computers for scientific research experiments.”
“[…] the US government has also restricted academic exchanges between China and the United States through visa restrictions (increasing the rejection rate and delaying the processing of visa applications).” E.g. in connection with this 2020 executive proclamation.
There are also instances of US-based Chinese researchers/students being unable to return to the US after a trip to China, with a negative effect on “China's ability to cultivate top quantum technology talents.”
The more optimistic view for China:
The negative impact on China will be temporary: “Since Chinese companies have not formed a key dependence on the United States in terms of quantum technology and key components, research and development can still circumvent the US export control on related quantum computing items through alternative solutions.” I think this is indeed a difference to the deeper and more specialised semiconductor supply chain, where dependencies and ecosystems have formed over decades on the basis of US-controlled IP.
US controls accelerate Chinese self-reliance efforts: “In the long run, the US containment strategy not only limits the development space of its own quantum technology industry in the Chinese market, but will also accelerate China's independent research and development process in this field.”
This is already happening: “In the past two years, China's domestic quantum chips have made breakthroughs, some quantum research institutions have accelerated the promotion of domestic substitution technologies, and related equipment (such as dilution refrigerators) have continued to upgrade and replace, and China's quantum technology autonomy process has continued to accelerate.”
There is still uncertainty about how successful the US alliance building (under the Biden administration) in quantum against China has been—and how enduring, see “superficiality in the US international alliance” in section (4) below.
The West is not all there is: The article briefly mentions the prospects of quantum communications among BRICS countries, with the example of Russia: “[…] at the end of 2023, China and Russia once again achieved a cross-border ‘full cycle’ quantum communication test.”
Self-harm for the US (backfire effect, 反噬效应):
Foregone Chinese market for US companies
Talent shortage in the US: “[the US] restricted normal academic exchanges between the two countries in the name of protecting national security, which may further aggravate the shortage of quantum talents in the United States and hinder the innovative development of quantum technology in the United States.”
The majority of US PhDs and postdocs in quantum are foreigners and “Following the increasing conservatism of U.S. politics, especially the U.S. government's restrictions on Sino-U.S. cultural and academic exchanges and its 'mistrust' of ethnic Chinese scientists, as well as uncertainties in U.S. immigration policy, these researchers may leave the United States and flow to other countries.”
(4) Three challenges to US leadership
Besides direct backfire effects, the article outlines three challenges to US leadership and its blockade of China in quantum technologies: Funding uncertainty and fragmented “multi-headed” (多头管理) management of quantum in the US, and superficiality in the US international alliance.
Funding uncertainty:
Stable and long-term government investment is crucial for quantum technology development: “However, given that U.S. quantum technology development is highly dependent on government financial support, against the backdrop of an economic downturn in the United States and a new Trump administration's demand to cut federal spending, the federal budget may undergo periodic adjustments, which could lead to instability in long-term financial support and affect scientific research and corporate investment decisions.” Very timely statement, seems that it does not even need an economic downturn for massive cuts to the US National Science Foundation (and others). That said, quantum funding, singled out among a few “priority areas,” was proposed to stay roughly constant in the White House budget proposal (which I guess means a decrease factoring in inflation). On that note, I have no idea about the status in US Congress on reauthorizing the National Quantum Initiative Act.
Private funding for quantum in a 2022-2023 “cooling-off period” amidst the AI hype: “global private investment in quantum technology fell by 32% year-on-year in 2022, and fell by 38% in 2023 compared with 2022. Among them, venture capital investment in quantum start-ups in the United States fell sharply by 80% in 2023.” The author argued that it was exactly US government funding that ensured R&D progress despite the downturn.
By now, this “cooling-off period” seems mostly past, with renewed growth of private VC in 2024. (Although in 2025, this was driven by few but large deals.) Still, the point about uncertainty in private funding is a good one. Downturns could come because of other fields (AI…) that gobble up capital and attention, economic downturns, or a “quantum winter” with slower technical progress than expected. On this front, the US quantum sector would be more strongly affected by any downturn than China, as, relative to China, more leading R&D happens in private companies, many of which rely heavily on private venture capital.
Fragmented management:
“[…] the development of quantum technology in the United States is characterized by multi-headed management (多头管理), which can easily lead to fragmented management problems.” There are multiple coordinating agencies and multiple departments (DoD, DoE, DHS, NIH, NSF, NASA), all of which have their own quantum development and international cooperation activities. “This development model helps promote the development of quantum application technologies in specific fields, but the lack of a unified cross-institutional coordination and cooperation mechanism may lead to problems such as insufficient coordination, duplicate resource allocation, and scattered research directions.” This dispersed approach is quite different from China, where research directions are coordinated more centrally through the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) / the Central Science and Technology Commission (CSTC).
Superficiality in the US international alliance:
A superficial cooperation: “[…] the content mainly focuses on the importance of quantum technology and the willingness to promote exchanges and cooperation based on common values.” Mainly dialogues, exchanges and research collaborations, but no clear roadmap. The collaboration is fairly loose, with no concrete mechanisms for technical collaboration, personal exchanges or joint funding plans.
A fundamental conflict of interest: “On the one hand, the United States wants to build a technological encirclement against China through cooperation with its allies, and on the other hand, it has to consider the importance of quantum technology to national security and the goal of maintaining its hegemony in the field of quantum technology. In the process of cooperation, there is a sense of caution and selfishness, which restricts the depth and breadth of cooperation.” I agree. In the EU, for example, technological sovereignty seems a big deal. The lack of big European players in the digital economy is a pain point, and no one wants to repeat the same mistakes for the next quantum revolution. Pair this with a new push to de-risk from America following the Munich Security Conference, and there are strong incentives to keep some limits on cooperation and prioritise local start-ups and capabilities at the cost of “allied scale.”
Coordination among the US and its allies could fracture going forward: “[…] the actual effect of the US export control of key equipment such as chips also depends on whether it can maintain close coordination with key allies. However, the United States and its allies also have a competitive relationship in the field of quantum technology. Against the backdrop of Trump's indiscriminate tariff policy towards allies in his second term and his ‘backstabbing’ of Europe on the Ukraine issue, it remains uncertain whether the US allies can maintain consistency with the US in their stance on the technological blockade against China.” Indeed, the US export controls on quantum computing were “plurilateral”, that is internationally coordinated but amongst an ad hoc group of allies instead of through institutionalized multilateral mechanisms such as the Wassenaar Arrangement (where Russia can veto). This might make it difficult to adjust existing controls or enact new ones without an active US push to coordinate with allies (which, due to the “backstabbing” and tariff issues, might be less receptive than under Biden).
There are no unified quantum standards yet, and different members of the US alliance might adopt different platforms. For example: “[…] many countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region have decided to use quantum key distribution (QKD) as the basis of their quantum secure communication strategy. […] However, the United States has chosen ‘post-quantum cryptography’ as a quantum security communication solution, which will restrict future cooperation between the United States and its allies in the field of quantum communications.” I don’t disagree with the argument that different standards / technological choices could hinder collaboration among the US and its allies. However, I would caution that for the example of QKD vs PQC it is not as easy as classifying countries into one of two camps. Most countries emphasise both technologies for quantum-secure communication (even in China, probably the country with the biggest bet on QKD, it is clear that PQC will be needed as well). There was recently a good commentary by Edward Parker on this issue of compatibility in quantum-safe communications between the US and its allies.
(5) My personal take
In my view, the article is a fairly accurate and sober account of US-China competition in quantum. Not much I outright disagree with, I largely share the take on export controls, for example (mix of short-term hindrances and a long-term acceleration). The piece also reaffirmed my view that Chinese America-watchers have a better grasp of America’s quantum ecosystem than most American China-watchers have of China’s (of course, they also have a different information system to work with…).
I commented on many parts directly above. Especially the section on challenges to US quantum leadership is very relevant in my opinion.
Against the backdrop of US budgeting, I feel like I read too many pieces with a narrow focus on China’s supposed “15 billion quantum funding” as the main factor necessitating larger government investments in the US. The article agrees that government funding has been critical to the US’ leading position it is in today. However, regarding challenges to long-term US leadership, rather than discussing the possibility of the US being outspent by China, it focuses more on structural challenges in US quantum funding: stability, long-term outlook, and coordinated resource allocation.
I find the third challenge—“superficiality in the US international alliance”—the most interesting to watch going forward, and likely the most consequential. The coming years could either solidify a US-led Western containment network against China in quantum, or slowly chip away at this Biden-era attempt, giving way to more independent and varied, and possibly more pragmatic, engagement with China in quantum among countries of the “West.”
A highly regarded Chinese state research institute and think tank for social sciences. Not to be confused with CAS, the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which plays an important role in China’s quantum research and also serves as a think tank (among many other things).
Quantum Key Distribution, a quantum technology for exchanging secret passwords between two parties
Quantum Random Number Generator
Post Quantum Cryptography, referring to (classical) cryptographic protocols believed to be secure against attackers enabled by quantum computers