Export controls accelerate a domestic Chinese quantum supply chain
My RUSI commentary on coming Chinese quantum exports to Europe
Last week, I published a commentary with the Royal United Services Institute on the effect of US-led export controls on the Chinese quantum technology ecosystem—and, conversely, on the implications of forthcoming Chinese quantum exports to Europe.
The commentary takes around 10 min to read and I recommend you to check it out on RUSI’s website. If you are in a hurry here is an incomplete summary of the basic argument:
Export controls, which escalated in 2024, have temporarily disrupted China’s quantum hardware and talent development. However, they are also supercharging localization efforts (“aligning demand with supply”) and accelerating China’s development of an independent quantum supply chain.
These domestic Chinese suppliers—especially those providing upstream components and specialized equipment—are likely to export to Europe. This is driven by factors such as local government competition, the marketing value of international clients, and a relatively permissive (even incentivizing) political environment.
This presents risks to Europe’s ambitions for tech sovereignty, but also significant opportunities. For example, a proactive approach to Chinese exports and business partnerships could open pathways for the diffusion of knowledge and best practices from an increasingly competitive (but, from a European perspective, often considered insular) Chinese quantum ecosystem.
A comment on the commentary:
The second point above runs counter to common Western narratives of a heavily securitized and deliberately insular Chinese quantum ecosystem. Indeed, it remains interesting to watch where the Chinese policy pendulum will settle between “quantum as a future industry” and “quantum as a national security issue.” I argue that, currently, the former is dominant in China, while the latter dominates US and, to an extent, UK discussions.
What about the EU? I had a cursory look at the recently published (2 July 2025) EU quantum strategy. It strongly frames quantum as an economic priority for Europe’s future, acknowledging the lagging “translation” of scientific prowess into market opportunities and well-funded start-ups as well as fragmentation of efforts. It also promises some measures that vaguely reminded me of existing Chinese “quantum industrial policy” (e.g. Quantum Grand Challenges, Quantum Sensing Roadmap, scientific infrastructure buildout, MSCA Choose Europe scheme, etc.).
On the other hand, regarding security, the strategy emphasizes strategic autonomy—secure supply chains, European infrastructure, independence from third-country regulations—and the protection of IP. While focussing on the UK, my commentary is thus also directly relevant to EU efforts to map supply chain vulnerabilities (under the ongoing Quantum Technology Risk Assessment) and to security considerations in inbound investment controls. I hope it can contribute to these debates, creating awareness of both future dependency risks as well as opportunities for diffusion and a more diverse supplier base.