The two CAICT quantum reports published in 2025 include aggregate numbers on Chinese quantum companies and their total funding, comparisons of Western and Chinese quantum cloud platforms, examples of how China deploys quantum sensors, and much more. Some things surprised me, such as the statistic that China has as many companies building quantum computers as the US.

Caveats: While these reports are generally of high quality and I have no reason to distrust their statistics (of which there are a lot), I would caution the reader to keep in mind that such reports are often (deliberately?) incomplete: For example, you will find great aggregate statistics, but limited granular analysis of individual Chinese quantum companies or China’s quantum supply chain. Often, there is more granular detail on Western industry leaders and policy initiatives than on Chinese ones. I can only presume this is due to a combination of factors, including the sensitivity of the topic, Western export controls (to avoid getting anyone targeted), and the target audience and objectives of the report (domestic industry and policy makers, likely aiming to inform them about relevant foreign developments and important strategic gaps). Finally, keep in mind that the reports were published in late 2025; many of the statistics only reflect events up to August 2025.

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With that out of the way, what quantum reports did CAICT publish in 2025? I am aware of two reports in late 2025:

• Research Report on the Development and Application of Quantum Information Technology (“Quantum Technology Report”, 量子信息技术发展与应用研究报告), dated November 2025. This one has been coming out yearly since 2018.

• Research Report on the Development Trends of Quantum Computing (“Quantum Computing Report”, 量子计算发展态势研究报告), dated September 2025, published jointly with QBoson (玻色量子) and a subsidiary of China Mobile (中移（苏州）软件技术有限公司).

In the following, I will go through bits that I found interesting and include machine translations of relevant figures. I recommend having a look at the reports yourself; there is a lot I don’t cover.

Five sections below: International quantum competition, China’s domestic landscape, Quantum Computing, Quantum Communications, Quantum Sensing.

The international quantum competition

US and China “first echelon” and the EU an “important force”

The report refers to the US and China as the “first echelon” (中美处第一梯队) and appears to primarily frame the global competition as a two-horse race between the US and China for overall leadership. Europe is described as “another important force” (另一重要力量) driving the development of the quantum tech industry. Europe is, however, acknowledged as a leader in the total quantity of quantum enterprises and has first-mover advantages in the upstream supply chain.

A lot of facts and figures are provided comparing metrics among different domestic and international regions:

Over 800 global quantum companies, around half in quantum computing …

… out of which 145 are in China, with China’s largest share in quantum communications

In the quantum computing field, China has fewer than half the number of US companies…

According to the Quantum Computing Report, by August 2025, there were over 400 companies in the quantum computing field globally, with 107 in the US and 42 in China.

… but China ties the US in the number of companies that actually build quantum computers

Among these 400+ companies, only over 70 companies actually develop quantum computers globally (the rest are upstream suppliers, software, and algorithm companies, etc.). Interestingly, China matches the US in the number of companies developing quantum computers: Both China and the US account for about 25% each (17-18 companies), with the EU at 22%.

In the figure above, China is absent in silicon and topological quantum computing approaches, which are still mostly pursued in research institutes in China (although Origin Quantum also pursues silicon quantum computing, but I guess they are categorized as superconducting). Compared to the US, China has roughly an equal number of companies developing superconducting quantum computers and leads (in quantity) in trapped ions and especially photonics. At three entries, the number of neutral atoms quantum computing companies seems behind the US, but I am not sure if this tally already includes the recent new Chinese entries to this field.

By simple math, this leaves only fewer than 25 Chinese companies (vs >80 in the US) in other areas of quantum computing that do not build quantum computers themselves. To me, this speaks to the strong vertical integration of some Chinese quantum computing companies, the comparatively smaller focus on quantum computing software, and a still underdeveloped upstream supply chain.

According to the Quantum Technology Report, as of August 2025, there are 12 quantum unicorn companies worldwide, with five in the US (average valuation 4.1 billion USD) and four in China (average valuation 1.4 billion USD). The Chinese unicorns are not mentioned by name, I assume they refer to QuantumCTek (国盾量子), Origin Quantum (本源量子), and CIQTEK (国仪量子), but the fourth one is less clear to me—maybe TuringQ (图灵量子), QBoson (玻色量子), SpinQ (量旋科技), or Huayi Quantum (华翊量子)? By now, they might all be close to unicorn valuation. Canada, Finland, and France each have one quantum unicorn.

Over the past decade, the report claims 1400 investment and financing events in the quantum tech industry, with more than 14.5 billion USD in funding, of which venture capital accounted for nearly 10 billion (the rest being government grants and stock markets?). The United States accounts for around half the funding, the EU for around 2 billion USD, while China saw 1.4 billion USD in quantum enterprise funding. (The Chinese number is very relevant2, I haven’t seen it reported elsewhere, and precise funding numbers for Chinese quantum companies, even for VC funding rounds, are not that easily accessible in my experience.)

Research papers, quantity: China first in quantum communications and measurement, US first in quantum computing and PQC (no combined EU figure)

The US dominates Quantum Computing patents, China follows with one-fourth of the global

Chinese provinces, by number of patent applications: Anhui (Hefei), Beijing, Jiangsu (Nanjing), Guangdong, Zhejiang (Hangzhou), Hubei (Wuhan), Shanghai …

China’s domestic landscape

The reports include many references to international quantum strategy documents by other countries, and also some references to Chinese policy initiatives. Not much detail is given, but I think it is worth noting what they deem important enough to mention.

Highlighted Chinese national policy initiatives

• Future Industry Framing (未来产业): Reference to the 2025 Government Work Report (2025 年政府工作报告), about which I wrote here.

• Major Science and Technology Projects (“Megaprojects”, 重大科技项目): I guess this refers to the Sci-Tech Innovation 2030—Quantum Communications and Quantum Computing Major Project (科技创新2030—量子通信与量子计算机重大项目), the national flagship quantum project.

• Large Scientific Facility Platforms (大科学设施平台)

• The Quantum Technology Report calls to accelerate the cultivation of specialized, refined, and innovative enterprises (专精特新企业), meaning innovative SMEs (small and medium enterprises) in key parts of the supply chain (I always think of this as China trying to replicate a version of Germany’s Mittelstand model).

• Standardization: The Quantum Computing Report mentions the MIIT Industrial and Information Technology Standards Work Points (2025 年工业和信息化标准工作要点) and their inclusion of quantum information standards. TC578, the responsible technical committee, approved a few standards, including on quantum computing service platforms, quantum computing benchmarking methods, and ultra-low temperature and noise systems for superconducting quantum computing.

• PQC algorithm solicitation: The Quantum Technology Report mentions the February 2025 call by the Commercial Cryptography Standards Institute (商用密码标准研究院) for PQC algorithms.

• Public application challenges (jiebang, 揭榜挂帅) by MIIT: They unveil tasks (e.g. “build a dilution refrigerator with specs at least XY”) and invite anyone who can solve them to apply. These challenges have been mirrored at the local level as well. I have talked about this in more detail here.

  • The Quantum Information Technology and Application Innovation Competition (量子信息技术与应用创新大赛) by QIIA is also mentioned.

Education and talent development

The Quantum Technology Report mentions that 17 universities have established quantum information science undergraduate programs, with USCT, Tsinghua University, Peking University, and Beihang University exploring the establishment of quantum technology colleges and quantum information classes (basically “Elite” programs like the Yao class at Tsinghua, I believe).

Who are the important domestic players?

In the following, direct quotes from the Quantum Technology Report:

• “In terms of scientific and technological strength, the Hefei National Laboratory, the Greater Bay Area Quantum Science Center, and the Beijing Academy of Quantum Sciences have become important sources of quantum technology innovation, while China Telecom and China Electronics Technology Group Corporation have driven the construction of the domestic industrial system.”3

• “In terms of supply chain security, breakthroughs have been achieved in the localization of key components and equipment such as high-end lasers, high-performance single-photon detectors, dilution refrigerators, electron beam lithography machines, and high-performance time analyzers.”4 — Unfortunately, no concrete names or references here, I assume due to concerns about export controls or sensitivity concerns.

• “In terms of science and technology industry clusters, Anhui, Beijing, Shanghai, and the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area are taking the lead in piloting and actively promoting the development of quantum technology and the layout of future industries, creating quantum technology centers and industrial clusters.”5

  • The Quantum Computing Report presents the following order: Beijing, Anhui, Guangdong, Shanghai, and Hubei …

  • … and highlights supportive measures such as local-gov sponsored research projects, future industry funds (未来产业基金), supporting new R&D institutions, constructing public platform facilities (公共平台设施), supporting startups, and providing demand for products and services through public procurement.

• In terms of innovations, the Quantum Technology Rerport highlight “the “Zu Chongzhi” superconducting quantum computing prototype [USTC, Pan/Zhu Xiaobo], the “Jiuzhang” optical quantum computing prototype [USTC, Pan/Lu Chaoyang], the “Tianyuan” quantum simulator [USTC, Pan/Chen Yao/Yao Yingcan, ultra-cold atoms], and the “Micius” [USTC, Pan/Peng Chengzhi] quantum science satellite are among the most important achievements in the world, and are at the international leading level.“6 — This is a very Pan-megagroup-heavy list, which, in addition to the technological significance of those, may also tell you something about the political support and narrative power they enjoy…

Let’s look at Quantum Computing, Quantum Communications, and Quantum Sensing separately. Both reports go into quite a bit of technical specs — I mostly limit myself to the high-level takeaways and things that stood out to me.

Quantum Computing

While the Quantum Computing Report describes a critical period of simultaneous development of technology, application, and industry, it also emphasizes that quantum computing is still in early stages with no “winner” yet in the various hardware routes, no “killer apps”, and quantum error correction remaining a key challenge (and hot area of research).

• Trends: As for quantum sensing below, convergence with AI is big (e.g. AI helps design quantum chips, quantum computers support AI training). For near-term applications, Quantum-Classical Hybrid Computing (量子-经典混合计算模式) is viewed as the most likely path.

• The most prominent Chinese technical quantum computing achievements in 2025:

  • Zuchongzhi No. 3 (祖冲之三号), USTC: Superconducting, 105 qubits with single/two-qubit gate and readout fidelities reaching 99.90%, 99.62%, and 99.18% respectively, random circuit sampling task. (I don’t think the below-threshold error correction experiment by the same group is included in the report.)

  • Tianmu No. 2 (天目 2 号), Zhejiang University: 100-qubit superconducting quantum chip, demonstrated topological edge states.

  • USTC: Two-dimensional atomic array of 2024 atoms (was big in the news at the time as a “world record”).

  • Peking University: Cluster state generation in optical quantum chips (基于集成光量子芯片的连续变量簇态量子纠缠).

  • QBoson (玻色量子): 1000-qubit optical quantum coherent Ising machine (1000 量子比特光量子相干伊辛机). Note: They are one of the report’s co-authors.

  • Shanghai Institute of Microsystem and Information Technology (SIMIT, 上海微系统所): Entanglement receiver chip (纠缠接收芯片)

  • (Jiuzhang 4 (九章4号), USTC, is not mentioned)

You can find a lot more details on technical developments, companies, and quantum computing applications in the report. Note that while some of the prominent Chinese quantum computing companies are mentioned, there is no comprehensive overview of the Chinese quantum computing enterprise ecosystem (there is one for Europe & North America, though…).

The importance of Benchmarking is highlighted repeatedly in the Quantum Computing Report. In this vein, CAICT launched a second version of a Quantum Computing Evaluation System (量子计算测评体系 2.0).7 This evaluation covers hardware, measurement & control, compilation tools, algorithms, cloud platforms, and application software. Out of these, I want to talk in more detail about quantum computing clouds.

Comparison of quantum computing cloud platforms

Quantum computing cloud platforms are described as crucial infrastructure supporting commercialization and industrial development. In my view, the Chinese quantum cloud players at the bottom of the figure still significantly lag their Western counterparts (indeed, the Quantum Technology Report highlights this area as something to be improved in China). However, as I mentioned in my piece on China’s quantum industrialization, I expect this gap to close going forward, and I think this area will be interesting to watch.

For better readability, here is the second half of the figure above as a bullet list:

• China Mobile (中国移动): Wuyue Jiyuan Quantum Cloud Platform (五岳纪元量子云平台)

  • Devices:

    • Superconducting: Tiangong No. 1 (天工 1 号), Wukong 102 (悟空 102), Wuyue No. 1/2/3 (五岳 1/2/3 号), Quafu No. 1/2/3/4/5 (夸父1/2/3/4/5号) — Wukong is from Origin Quantum (本源量子) and Quafu from BAQIS (see below); as for Tiangong, I am not sure, I thought that was one of QBoson’s earlier devices (which wouldn’t make sense as it is categorized as superconducting).

    • CIM (Coherent Ising Machine): Coherent Optical Quantum Computer (相干光量子计算机), from QBoson (玻色量子)

    • Ion Trap: <Aba|Qu>100, from QuDoor / Qike Quantum (启科量子)

    • Neutral Atom: Hanyuan No. 1 (汉原 1 号)

  • Based on this figure, China Mobile has onboarded quite a lot of systems (and they reportedly also have a trapped Ion device from Huayi now), yet I couldn’t find a public-facing cloud platform last time I checked.

  • Note: China Mobile is one of the report’s co-authors.

• China Telecom (中国电信): Tianyan Quantum Computing Cloud Platform (天衍量子计算云平台)

  • Superconducting: Xiaohong (骁鸿), Zu Chongzhi No. 2 (祖冲之 2 号), from QuantumCTek (国盾量子)

  • In the meantime, the Zu Chongzhi No. 3 chip has reportedly also been onboarded by China Telecom.

• Beijing Academy of Quantum Information Sciences (BAQIS, 北京量子信息科学研究院): Quafu (夸父量子计算云平台)

  • Superconducting: Baihua, Dongling, Haituo, ScQ-P21

• Bose Quantum (玻色量子): Bose Quantum Cloud (玻色量子云)

  • CIM: CPQC-1000

• Origin Quantum (本源量子): Origin Quantum Cloud (本源量子云)

  • Superconducting: Origin Wukong (本源悟空)

• QuantumCTek (国盾量子): QuantumCTek Computing Cloud Platform (国盾量子计算云平台)

  • Superconducting: Xiaohong 1 (骁鸿 1 号)

• QuDoor / Qike Quantum (启科量子): <Qu|Cloud>

  • Ion Trap: <Aba|Qu>100

• SpinQ (量旋科技): SpinQ Cloud Platform (量旋云平台)

  • Superconducting (no specific model given)

• Arc Light Quantum (弧光量子): Arc Light Quantum Cloud Platform (弧光量子云平台):

  • Superconducting and ion trap chips (no specific model given)

(The rest of this post is fully based on the Quantum Technology Report)

Quantum Communications

Quantum secure communication (QKD+QRNG) is described as in a stage of preliminary utility (初步实用化):

• In terms of technical directions, the report notes that twin-field (TF-QKD) and mode-pairing QKD (MP-QKD) protocols are active areas of development and that space-to-ground QKD has become a hot topic (with China maintaining its lead, I discussed this more here).

• In terms of deployment, the report distinguishes between online (tightly coupled, 紧耦合) and offline (loosely coupled, 松耦合) QKD+QRNG solutions. The former, referring to the deployment of QKD devices directly with the encryption equipment, is very expensive and inflexible but highly secure. The latter involves an intermediate key management layer (think dedicated China Mobile SIM cards that contain QKD keys); this is cheaper and more flexible, but with a “last mile delivery” problem.

• The report highlights a few application examples, such as such as China Telecom Quantum partnering with Huawei to complete a 2000 km quantum-secure OTN (optical transport network) link between Hefei and Inner Mongolia; Nanjing University and USTC demonstrating drone-to-ground QKD; China Telecom Quantum developing a "Quantum Safe Gas Station Tax Control System" (量子安全加油站税控系统) to manage oil retail data; China Mobile launching the "Zhongyi Mixun" (中移密讯) service using Super SIM cards for encrypted office communication; State Grid (国家电网) using QKD for encryption in its "220kV Hefei Houdian Quantum Application Demonstration Substation" (220千伏合肥候店量子应用示范变电站); and USTC using the "Jinan No. 1" (济南一号) micro-nano satellite to achieve intercontinental quantum key distribution.

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) vs Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in 2025

[Disclaimer: My job is in the field of QKD, so I may have a slight conflict of interest here.]

It is a common (increasingly less applicable) narrative that China went all in on QKD while the US went the opposite direction, with a strong focus on PQC. In this context, it is interesting that the Quantum Technology Report is quite frank about the challenges of QKD: Lacking performance indicators (key generation rate, transmission distances), high costs and infrastructure requirements, difficulties in managing trusted relays, and intensifying competition with the PQC industry.

The report notes that as US (NIST) PQC standards set industry trends, China’s own PQC standardization is accelerating and poses a commercial threat for QKD: PQC is currently much cheaper, easier to integrate, end-to-end, and (once domestic standards are finalized) meets compliance requirements. Therefore (according to the report), for most scenarios, QKD is not necessary. In addition, “whether and how the PQC+QKD integrated encryption scheme can achieve a synergistic effect (1+1>2) requires further exploration by the industry.”8

I compared this to some of the older CAICT reports from prior years. Back in 2022 and 2023, PQC+QKD fusion was emphasized. The two technologies were described as complementary (defense-in-depth). The 2024 report then marks a bit of a narrative shift: In the period of the 2024 report, European cyber agencies issued critical position papers on QKD, which were referenced in the CAICT report, noting that “problems and controversies still exist.” Finally, the 2025 report clearly positions PQC as the primary solution, with fast migration a priority and fusion with QKD (for most) optional. (No specific quantum-safe transition timeline is mentioned for China.)

With all this QKD criticism, let it also be said that the report does highlight positive developments in the QKD field, such as the application examples mentioned above and breakthroughs in miniaturization (e.g. chip-based QKD at BAQIS, the Beijing Academy of Quantum Information Sciences). Furthermore, for specific high-security private network scenarios, the information-theoretic security of QKD remains a unique technical advantage. This is recognized as a means to further strengthen security beyond PQC alone and mitigate concerns about the long-term future resilience of PQC algorithms.

Quantum Sensing

As the figure below demonstrates, there are a lot of different quantum sensing technologies, making overarching statements about the field as a whole difficult.

• In terms of maturity, the report highlights atomic clocks as highly mature and commercial (with research on next-generation optical atomic clocks booming). Following this are quantum radar/lidar, gravimeters, and magnetometers. Quantum gyroscopes and Rydberg antennas on the least mature end are still climbing the peak of inflated expectations, according to the 2025 Quantum Technology Report.

• In terms of big picture trends, the report notes convergence with AI (AI for optimizing control parameters and processing noisy output data) and applications in critical infrastructure, resource exploration, and biomedicine.

The Quantum Technology Report dives quite deeply into some of the quantum sensing verticals (especially clocks). For this post, let’s end it with some examples of Chinese technical breakthroughs and applications mentioned in the report.

Chinese quantum sensing applications in 2025

• Pipelines: The National Pipe Network Group Research Institute (国家管网集团研究总院) applied quantum magnetometers for pipeline micro-defect detection.

• Resource exploration: The MCC Wukan Quantum Prospecting Research Institute (中冶武勘量子探矿研究院) conducted mineral exploration using Quantum Gravity Meters (量子重力仪) and Drone-borne Cesium Atom Optical Pump Magnetometers (无人机搭载的铯原子光泵磁力计).

• Quantum Lidar for environmental monitoring: Guoyao Quantum (国耀量子) deployed a "Particulate Matter Optical Quantum Lidar Environmental Monitoring Network" (颗粒物光量子雷达环保监测网络).

• Power Grid: In what seems to be a major demonstration project, State Grid (国家电网) put the "220kV Hefei Houdian Quantum Application Demonstration Substation" (220千伏合肥候店量子应用示范变电站) into operation with 18 types and 85 sets of quantum equipment, including:

  • Quantum Current Transformers (量子电流互感器): Measuring magnetic fields utilizing nitrogen-vacancy (NV) center-based technology. Application advantage: High precision.

  • Quantum Non-destructive Flaw Detectors (量子无损探伤仪): Measuring magnetic fields utilizing the tunnel magnetoresistance (TMR) effect. Application advantage: High efficiency.

  • Quantum Distribution Network Current Sensors (量子配网电流传感器): Measuring magnetic fields utilizing the tunnel magnetoresistance (TMR) effect. Application advantage: High flexibility.

  • Integrated Quantum DC Energy Meters (一体式量子直流电能表): Measuring magnetic fields utilizing the tunnel magnetoresistance (TMR) effect. Application advantage: High integration (高集成度).

  • Quantum Dot Fire Sensors (量子点火灾传感器): Measuring gases utilizing quantum dot MEMS technology. Application advantage: Extremely early warning.

  • Quantum Dot Multi-parameter Sensors (量子点多参量传感器): Measuring multiple gas parameters utilizing quantum dot MEMS technology. Application advantage: Multi-parameter online monitoring.

  • Optical Quantum Radar (光量子雷达): Measuring signals utilizing single-photon detection technology. Application advantage: High sensitivity.

  • Quantum Time Synchronization Devices (量子时间同步装置): Synchronizing time utilizing integrated space-ground quantum time synchronization technology. Application advantage: High stability.

  • Quantum Attitude* Sensors (量子姿态传感器): Measuring magnetic fields utilizing the tunnel magnetoresistance (TMR) effect. Application advantage: High precision. *Apparently, “attitude” refers to the orientation of an object in 3D space.

Chinese quantum sensing technical breakthroughs in 2025

• Strontium Optical Lattice Clock, CAS National Time Service Center: Achieved a systematic uncertainty of 1.96×10^−18, making China the second country (after the US) in the world to break the 2×10^−18 threshold.

• Ultra-Sensitive Inert Gas Detector, USTC: Utilized an inert gas nuclear spin system to amplify magnetic field signals by 145 times, achieving ultra-high sensitivity detection of weak magnetic fields with optimal filtering.

• Spin Squeezed Magnetometry, Fudan University: Achieved steady-state atomic spin squeezed states and used machine learning to reach a continuous measurement sensitivity surpassing the standard quantum limit.

• Space Cold Atom Interferometry, CAS Precision Measurement Institute: Conducted atomic cooling and interferometry experiments inside the “Tiangong” Space Station (Tianhe Core Module, 天和核心舱), achieving quantum inertial rotational measurement under microgravity conditions.

7

In this piece, I want to talk about the big picture of China’s quantum sector and government strategy. I will share predictions on the high-level transition that is taking shape in China’s quantum sector and discuss interesting, largely unreported (in English-language media) recent developments. Admittedly, some of these predictions are preliminary and speculative; feedback and push-back are very much welcome.

Before the 2020s, the primary objective in Chinese policy documents was to build the scientific and technological foundation (the “National Strategic S&T Forces”) for future leadership in quantum information technologies. The policy tools of that era were talent plans, national laboratories, and fast-growing research funding. This period was accompanied by significant reorganization that continued well into the 14th five-year plan (FYP14, 2021-2025), but appears largely completed in the quantum sector and is giving way to a new number one priority: Industrialization.

Already since the 2020s, Chinese policy documents have increasingly talked about the application and industrialization of quantum technologies. China is now walking the talk.

In 2025, cultivating companies, applications, and markets are becoming the new number one priority for quantum technology, elevated above even foundational technological breakthroughs such as quantum satellites or quantum advantage computations. The strategic logic transitions from a linear “Science-Push” model to a mission-driven pull from the quest for New Quality Productive Forces (NQPF)1.

The quantum S&T policy tools of the pre-2020 era were successfully established and reorganized; they are now joined by quantum industrial policies such as dedicated Government Guidance Funds (GGF), quantum tech parks and incubators, “bounty” competitions (揭榜挂帅), and the entry at scale by some of China’s biggest SOEs.

The implications are significant and, given the successful marginalization of China’s quantum business sector during the Biden administration, may surprise many Western quantum professionals: Expect Chinese quantum exports slowly working their way from upstream components to downstream end user platforms, expect more international partnerships announcements, especially with BRI countries, and, ironically for many, expect a China that appears internationally increasingly open while Europe and the US are closing doors.

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Apologies for the lack of posts in recent months. Your author has been exceedingly busy with other projects. Planning to find a healthy cadence of China∩Quantum Briefs, but in lack of time this combines an update on recent developments and some broader analysis.

This piece is structured as follows:

1. A new framing: Contrasting the recent five-year plan recommendations with FYP14, I discuss what has evolved in the high-level priorities of the Chinese government and its framing of quantum technologies.

2. Quantum as the #1 Future Industry and what this means in practice: I discuss concrete policies in Hefei, the heartland of China’s quantum ecosystem, and what this means for concrete applications in quantum computing, communication, and sensing.

3. Export controls and self-reliance revisited: The discussion wouldn’t be complete without discussing Western export controls and China’s self-sufficiency efforts.

4. What does all this mean internationally?

1) The transition: From building the foundations to laying out future industries

The Party’s recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan

The CPC Central Committee recently issued recommendations for the 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP15 recommendations). Unsurprisingly, Science and Technology Innovation (S&TI), self-reliance, and industrial modernization play prominent roles in FYP15. On a high level, the priorities are:

1. Industrial Modernization

2. Innovation, S&T self-reliance

3. Consumption and Domestic Demand

4. High-level socialist market

5. Opening up

6. … other priorities.

For quantum, we care about 1. and 2., the top two priorities (order matters here). In comparison to FYP14, this puts industrial modernization from the second to the top spot, changing places with innovation and S&T self-reliance.2

In quantum, this “swap” absolutely agrees with the shift in strategic logic I am observing: From a linear “Science-push” perspective — build up the underlying technological capabilities, then build a modern economy on top of this basis — to a “Mission-Pull” approach — starting from industrial goals and scenarios, leverage S&T as the engine to achieve these goals and lead NQPF.

The FYP15 recommendations are much lighter on detail than the full FYP15 will be, and quantum is only explicitly mentioned once — as a future industry in the section on industrial modernization.

Maybe the most overused phrase in the quantum field is that “quantum is moving from the lab into real-world applications.” Is the quantum future industry framing just a rehash with Chinese characteristics?

Partly — China’s Quantum Information Association (QIAC) phrases the focus on applications as follows: “Quantum technology is moving from the ‘future’ to the ‘present.’ It is no longer just a theoretical exploration in the laboratory, but an important direction for new productive forces, becoming a key force driving industrial upgrading and technological innovation.”

All this sounds quite vague and hypey, but there is more differentiation3 to it. Below, we will dive into detail about how this transition is to be brought about by Chinese policies and how it might look in quantum computing, quantum communications, and quantum sensing.

Future Industries: Quantum tech becomes number one

Already in FYP14, quantum was listed second among the future industries; now it has moved to the number one spot4, followed by biomanufacturing and hydrogen & nuclear fusion.

Beyond quantum moving up to the top spot (again: order matters here), compared to FYP14, the framing has shifted from merely accelerating and incubating these future industries towards actively shaping their future layout and identifying areas where they can contribute to economic growth.

This list of future industries are the “offensive list” in China’s industrial modernization strategy: With no entrenched technological paradigm dominated by Western companies and with China at the “same starting line” as traditional developed countries, these fields, tomorrow’s strategic emerging industries, provide an opportunity for China “overtake in the corner” (弯道超车) and reshape the global value chain.

The foundation: National Strategic S&T Forces

During FYP14, the reorganization and construction of China’s National Strategic S&T Forces were central to the innovation section of the FYP. What followed was the establishment of the Central Science and Technology Commission (CSTC) in 2023, a comprehensive reorganization of State Key Laboratories (SKL, 国家重点实验室) and the construction of a new generation of National Laboratories (国家实验室). Beyond just being the highest-level national research institutions, these (new) national labs are to lead the overall innovation system and achievement of national tasks.

Among the list of six areas for national lab construction in FYP14, quantum information was the first. Indeed, while I am not very familiar with the other five fields, I wouldn’t be surprised if the quantum national lab is the first that has been completed out of this new generation of national labs. The Hefei National Quantum Lab began its construction already in 2017 and became fully operational during FYP14. Besides being a sprawling research facility, it manages the Sci-Tech Innovation 2030 Quantum megaproject (科技创新2030—量子通信与量子计算机重大项目), China’s flagship national quantum research megaproject.5 The Sci-Tech Innovation 2030 Quantum megaproject was announced in 2016, and although it does include quantum technology applications, I would firmly put it into the “old #1” priority area of strengthening scientific and technological foundations.6

With the reorganization of the S&T ecosystem (at least for quantum) largely completed, the FYP15 recommendations aim to leverage the National S&T Forces for breakthroughs in key core technologies (self-reliance) and to lead the road to New Quality Productive Forces.7

The new top priority

In recent years, the emphasis on the “Future Industry” designation — introduced by Xi in 2020 — of quantum technologies has taken increased prominence.

This framing puts the mission, industrial modernization, into the centre and introduces a range of industrial policy tools into the quantum sector: Government Guided Funds (GGF), quantum tech parks and incubators, “bounty” competitions (揭榜挂帅), and the active involvement of SOEs.

By no means do these new measures replace government labs, basic science funding, and talent plans. Rather, new quantum industrial policies reorient the National S&T Forces towards the mission of industrial modernization and, with it, expand an area of the Chinese quantum ecosystem that has long been lagging behind the West.

When I came to China in 2023, the impression I had was that the private Chinese quantum sector was tiny, and most of the funding and talent were instead concentrated in research institutions. Start-ups, where they existed, were relatively low-profile, hustling away at building cool stuff, but very barebones, without the marketing and PR teams of Western start-ups (some possibly also keeping a low profile to avoid joining the Chinese quantum companies on the US entity list). More importantly, there didn’t seem to be meaningful Chinese user communities or well-maintained open-source software products. Where are all the software and quantum algorithm companies, where are the consulting businesses promising that quantum will change the world — and that *you need them* to make you quantum-ready? Where are the quantum cloud platforms and SDKs, the Chinese Qiskit and Pennylane? Where are the student hackathons, where is the Chinese Quantum x Society / responsible quantum (ResQT) community?

I still haven’t found the Chinese ResQT community (Please reach out if you know!), and I would expect pure play quantum consulting or algorithm companies to continue lagging the West. But on all the other points, I believe that things are rapidly changing. Quantum technology is declared to be the number one future industry, and with it comes a focus on building applications and application platforms by deploying China’s well-honed set (plus quite a few new ones) of industrial policy tools.

Let’s dive deeper into the logic and policy tools through which the Chinese government aims to shape the future layout of the quantum industry and identify economically meaningful applications.

2) Quantum as a future industry, in practice

Both local government R&D funding, accounting for around ⅔ of fiscal S&T expenditures, and economic competition among provinces (“local state corporatism”) are defining features of China’s innovation ecosystem. Therefore, to understand how the Future Industry designation is put into practice, Anhui province and its city of Hefei, China’s “quantum capital,” are an instructive place to start.

Thousands of quantum applications

Anhui province’s “Quantum Information ‘Thousand Scenarios’ Action” (量子信息“千家场景”行动) is probably the most ambitious local government action plan to identify quantum applications in the economy.

Led by the local DRC (Development and Reform Commission), it aims to cultivate 300 quantum application scenarios by the end of 2025, 1,000 by the end of 2027, and over 3,000 by 2030. For quantum, these are really big numbers.

It is one of the first local implementations of a new, wider national initiative8 to promote the large-scale application of technology (beyond quantum) in new scenarios.

How are they planning to achieve this? By heavily leveraging state-owned enterprises (SOEs). These SOEs and other enterprises (demand side) are encouraged to trial, and eventually operate and scale, quantum applications provided by the large ecosystems of research institutes and quantum startups in Hefei (supply side; Hefei’s quantum industrial chain is now said to encompass nearly 100 companies — the usual caveats apply). The local government plays the role of a matchmaker between supply and demand. Successful model scenarios are then publicized as benchmarks.

In addition to matchmaking meetings, the local government organizes challenges where bottlenecks or industry needs submitted by enterprises (posting unit) are publicized as competitive challenges9. Other enterprises, or research institutes (solving unit), can then apply to solve the challenge, with consortia encouraged as long as they have no relationship to the issuing unit.

Examples of such challenges posted in Anhui in 2025 include the development of low-temperature electronics for superconducting quantum computers and the development of a measurement and control system for error correction on ion trap quantum computers.

It seems that most of the funding will be provided by the SOEs and other enterprises on the demand side, although the local government provides subsidies. Furthermore, in many cases, the government will be the eventual end user, such as in the case of the Hefei City QKD network. Here, the government funding for operation and maintenance is adjusted based on an annual project assessment that includes KPIs related to how successful the project is in spurring wider industrial development.

The government also aims to provide the necessary infrastructure for turning research prototypes into mass-producible products. A recent central government notice10 calls on local governments to establish “pilot-scale platforms in manufacturing,” with quantum technologies one of a few priority areas.11 These platforms are to provide verification services, physical infrastructure — such as, for quantum, expensive high-power dilution refrigerators, ultra-stable lasers, or electron beam lithography machines — and trial-production lines.

No doubt, all this ambition, the huge number of planned quantum applications should be taken with a grain of salt, with waste and largely useless quantum marketing stunts to come. But I would be surprised if none of these thousand trials hit something that works.

Before we look at what this means specifically for quantum computing, quantum communications, and quantum sensing, let’s try to understand how Chinese planners prioritize different quantum application scenarios.

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Which technologies are ready for application?

The recently published Chinese roadmap for the standardization of quantum information technology applications12 provides an excellent framework for answering this question. It introduces a scoring called “Application Readiness Level” (ARL) that combines technological readiness (TRL) with application matching/fit and business viability.

A given quantum technology is then identified for urgent standardization if it is of high application readiness with little existing standardization. Simple as that. Of course, national policy priorities and international opportunities to take the lead can adjust the prioritization as needed.

The excellent roadmap provides an explicit list of quantum application scenarios and their respective estimated ARL. In the following tables, we highlight the most mature ones, with ARL 7-9 (9 being the highest). These are the applications we should be thinking of when discussing how China’s pivot to quantum industrialization plays out in practice in quantum computing, quantum communications, and quantum sensing.

Industrialization in Quantum Computing

Quantum Computing is the least application-mature among the three areas of quantum information technology. Unsurprisingly, only one high-ARL application is mentioned in the standardization roadmap, and that one kind of cheats: The manufacturing of quantum computers themselves and their components.

Despite this lack of high-ARL applications, I believe there are other things to look out for in the impact of China’s industrialization drive on quantum computing: Cloud platforms and open source software communities.

To date, China seems to be trailing the West in competitive cloud platforms through which quantum computers can be accessed remotely. Ditto (mostly) for associated open source software communities and user bases.

I believe that the time of China not having serious and professional quantum cloud platforms is about to be over. In addition to the larger quantum start-ups themselves (QuantumCTek, Origin Quantum, QBoson, …), the big ones to watch here are the telecom SOEs.

China Telecom has established its own quantum subsidiary in Hefei, with a controlling stake in QuantumCTek and more than CNY 10 billion of planned investments over the coming years. Besides significant business in QKD, China Telecom launched its own quantum cloud platform (Tianyan, 天衍). For now, it only features QuantumTek’s superconducting quantum computers, but I would expect that they will eventually onboard other partners. China Mobile also launched its own platform (Wuyue, 五岳), intentionally hardware-agnostic; they have onboarded photonic (QBoson) and trapped ion (from Huayi Quantum) platforms and are planning for neutral atoms.

To build a quantum computing talent and user base, I have come across a variety of large Chinese quantum computing hackathons (e.g., CCF “Sinan Cup” (司南杯), China Mobile “Wuyue Cup” (五岳杯), MindSpore), some with quite general prize budgets. In addition to building user and developer communities, these hackathons are also increasingly leveraged to solve challenges posted by enterprises or to develop promising quantum applications13.

Industrialization in Quantum Communications

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is significantly more mature than quantum computing. While implementation-specific performance and security standards are still lacking, the application (not just the manufacturing) of fiber-based QKD already scores 8 out of 9 in application readiness according to the Chinese standardization roadmap.

It is well-known that China is many years ahead of the rest of the world in the actual deployment of QKD networks for the transition to quantum-safe cryptography, with over 12,000 km of QKD backbone network and at least 16 local area networks. The Hefei local area network alone has over 150 nodes and 1’000km of QKD fiber links, larger than most national networks.

Here too, China Telecom is one of the important SOEs to watch, as it markets various QKD (and PQC)-secured endproducts such as distributing QKD keys to phones through SIM cards (claiming to serve over 5 million users) or a QKD-secured cloud service.

Furthermore, one major achievement of FYP15 will likely be progress in integrating land-based and space-based QKD, with the world’s first QKD satellite network coming in the next few years (which I believe will also be operated by China Telecom).

Industrialization in Quantum Sensing

In quantum sensing, the insertion of “quantum” into various pilot and industrial upgrading projects by SOEs and local governments becomes the most obvious. As seen in the table, examples are plentiful and seem to be quickly maturing.

Specific examples include high-precision NV-center magnetic field sensors (applied to magnetocardiography), quantum current sensors for ultra-high voltage lines14, or quantum gravimeters in the oil and gas industry.

Again, SOEs, such as grid operators or mining corporations, are natural partners to trial such pilots aligned with the government’s set of future industries.

There are also exciting science experiments, such as tests of general relativity and quantum-enhanced telescopes, that may soon be realized on the back of Chinese progress in quantum sensing and communication equipment.

What it means for China’s quantum companies

Importantly for China’s fledgling quantum companies, the entry of SOEs brings revenue and early demand, while the multitude of new quantum-focused GGFs brings “patient” capital. Most recently, a 51 billion CNY Central Enterprises Strategic Emerging Industries Development Special Fund was announced, backing quantum, AI, and high-end equipment as the three main investment areas.

I would expect China’s private sector quantum supply chain and full-stack quantum startups to continue growing at a rapid pace.

It is now no longer completely unusual to have multiple Chinese quantum startups announce CNY 100 million+ funding rounds in a single month.

For example, QBoson (玻色量子, photonic quantum computing) and CIQTEK (国仪量子, mainly quantum sensing) both recently raised funding rounds of over CNY 100 million. New players continue to enter the field, such as two Hangzhou-based companies MatriQ (neutral atoms quantum computing, seed round), Logical Qbit (逻辑比特, superconducting quantum computing, CNY 10s of millions, Pre-A round), or e-Spin (磁性量子, seed round, electron-spin based quantum computing … or quantum-inspired computing?).

While QuantumCTek (国盾量子) remains the only publicly listed pure-quantum company in China, Hefei’s other two big quantum champions — CIQTEK (国仪量子) and Origin Quantum (本源量子) — are also expected to go public in the not-too-distant future.

With all this activity, I wonder how long it will take until some of these companies offer products at a meaningful scale that combine real quantum advantage (for some eventual end user) with profitability. Until then, as elsewhere in the world, the sector will heavily rely on government money, be it through research funding, subsidies & tax breaks, GGFs, or SOE and government purchases.

Having discussed China’s ambitions and flurry of activity to build a future quantum industry, what are the hurdles? After all, many leading quantum institutes and companies in China are on the US entity list, US investments are nearly completely barred, and, under the Biden administration, the US coordinated sweeping export controls on the quantum supply chain together with allied countries.

Let’s revisit quantum export controls and the Chinese struggle for self-sufficiency.

3) Export controls and self-reliance

Overcoming industrial and technological chokepoints, phrased as self-reliance and self-strengthening (自立自强), still plays a very prominent role in the FYP15 recommendations.

The FYP15 recommendations are more concrete than FYP14 and provide a specific “hit-list” of six areas slanted for decisive breakthroughs: Semiconductors, foundational machine tools, high-end instruments, basic software, advanced materials, and biomanufacturing15 — with high-end instruments most relevant to quantum technologies.

“Extraordinary measures” shall be adopted to achieve these decisive breakthroughs; what this means concretely remains to be seen, but the strong language has experts worried.

Notably, quantum technologies do not feature separately in this list, despite significant escalations of Western restrictions over the last years, which escalated in 2024, with broad entity list additions, outbound investment restrictions, and the addition of quantum computers and related equipment to the US Commerce Control List in coordination with allies.

Can we conclude from the absence of quantum technologies in the “hit-list” that the quantum restrictions are not a major concern and hence have not been effective? There are a few examples one could make to support this view:

• Steady cadence of self-reliant hardware announcements, often claimed (although this should be taken with a grain of salt) to be internationally competitive: Dilution refrigerators (at least 7 companies by this point), control electronics (1, 2, 3), lasers (1), interconnects (1), (superconducting) quantum chip production (1), photon detectors (1), etc.

• Continuance of impressive technical achievements in spite of the escalation of Western restrictions around 2024. For example, the USTC/National Quantum Lab superconducting quantum computing group recently caught up to Google’s Willow chip below-threshold error correction breakthrough, all despite having to develop their own dilution refrigerator and control electronics due to export controls!

• Ambitious targets: While some of the more concrete project competitions (e.g., those issued by the National Lab) are unfortunately no longer to be made public, the targets that I have seen remain highly ambitious. Take for example the 17 quantum challenges16 issued by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology earlier this year. By 2026, they ask for:

  • Control electronics for >1000 qubits

  • dilution refrigerators with cooling power ≥3000 μW at 100 mK

  • quantum error correction with surface code distance ≥5/color code ≥3 (which has already been surpassed with distance 7 surface code by both Google and Zhu Xiaobo’s group)

  • quantum OS supporting ≥4 hardware types and ≥2000 qubits

  • carbon-monitoring quantum lidar with ≥2km range

  • portable quantum gravimeter

  • …

  • … — while I am no expert on the technicalities of these challenges, the specific and quantified targets do signal confidence to contribute to the very frontier of the field, all despite lacking access to big parts of the Western quantum supply chain.

Generally, it is indeed my view that there are no durable Western chokepoints over China in quantum technologies and that restrictions have only caused temporary complications, at the cost of accelerating the emergence of a truly self-reliant quantum supply chain in China.

I have written about export controls in the past, arguing that they will not be effective beyond a decade, mainly due to the early development status of quantum and, compared to semiconductors, internationally dispersed supply chain, as well as the long advance-signalling of impending quantum controls. These controls have slowed Chinese efforts in the short term, at the “cost” of bringing the users on board with Chinese localization efforts: Leading laboratories and quantum start-ups have no choice but to rapidly iterate with domestic suppliers in replacing foreign dependencies. Given the long timelines until quantum technologies are useful, choosing short-term disruption over long-term acceleration is a much dumber strategy in quantum than in AI.

Export controls also significantly contribute to the risk of a broader “bifurcation” in quantum technologies.

That said, I do not think China’s transition to a fully self-reliant quantum supply chain is complete. There are remaining dependencies, and they probably nearly all fall (with exceptions in some material inputs, such as Helium-3) under the High-end Instruments (高端仪器) category of the “hit-list.” In addition to import dependencies, the international isolation of China’s quantum sector also has other negative consequences, such as market access and research partnerships.

Removing foreign dependencies and relying on domestic alternatives in the enabling “picks and shovels” to build quantum tech likely remain among the highest priorities for China’s quantum planners. However, on the downstream end, I would expect fewer worries about export controls on full-stack quantum computers or their cloud access. Instead, in the FYP recommendations, these endproducts, downstream applications, and user platforms are part of the “offensive future industry list,” not the “defensive self-reliance hit-list.”

4) What does all this mean outside of China?

As Chinese quantum cloud platforms and user communities mature, as more and more industrial applications are tried, and as previously low ARL start-ups market more standardized quantum products, what does this mean for the internationalization of China’s quantum industry?

Internationalization vs Insularity

I believe the period of FYP15 will see a stronger push of China’s quantum industry abroad. I have elaborated reasons for this before: Hone the global competitiveness of local champions, shape global standards, and capture the economic value of this future industry. Intensifying domestic competition adds to the push abroad.

The doubling down on framing quantum as a Future Industry, rather than (at least publicly) first and foremost as a national security-driven race for fault-tolerant quantum computing, strengthens my belief that high-value exports of quantum components will be encouraged, with limited export controls.

Further, I expect that international engagement in quantum will become more deliberate. This will likely include (continued) support for attracting talent from abroad and engaging in research collaborations, as well as China-based international quantum conferences, quantum hackathons, or other quantum exchange activities.

Beyond such exchange activities, expect to see a more deliberate effort to shape the global quantum industry and its standards, gain market share, and establish a favorable foothold in the future quantum value chain.

This may not be surprising to “China watchers” who see similar developments in more mature industries.

However, I am not sure how many people in the Western quantum ecosystem see this coming, given how locked out Chinese quantum companies appear from the quantum industry taking shape in Europe and the US.

The expectation that China’s relative isolation will continue is likely reinforced by the common characterization of China’s quantum ecosystem as insular and secretive. As I elaborated in the introduction of this blog, I have a more nuanced view. I partially agree with this characterization, given limited transparency on implementation and funding details of national quantum programs, increased geo-blocking of relevant websites (limiting access from outside China), and the deepening focus on self-reliance and competition with America.

At the same time, many leading quantum research institutes in China remain very open to international collaborations, actively hire foreigners, and even have dedicated budgets for internationalization. I have always found Chinese quantum researchers very willing to share details about their work and go out of their way to accommodate language barriers.

Of course, China is big, and international openness surely differs by institute, with some groups rumored to hire exclusively Chinese, but my overall impression is that the “internationalization drive” often still outweighs the “securitization drive” that has become so defining in Europe and the US.

Chinese quantum export controls are much more limited than in the US and Europe. Anecdotally, you can already find examples of Chinese quantum exports. This includes upstream exports to Western countries (e.g. lasers) and more prominent quantum computing exports to the Middle East, Pakistan, South East Asia, Russia, and BRI countries more broadly.

In addition to Chinese quantum exports, I wouldn’t be surprised if we hear of some foreign investments (e.g., from the Middle East) into China’s quantum sector during FYP15. After all, foreign quantum investments are officially encouraged by MOFCOM, and China’s commercial quantum sector is rapidly growing.

Beyond anecdotal evidence, I find it hard to say how successful China’s quantum internationalization will be in FYP15. I think the latest point when it will happen is once economic forces come into play as quantum becomes a “real industry” (not a future industry) with demonstrated practical applications, including for more “China-friendly” BRI and Global South countries.

So maybe we have to wait until FYP16? I don’t know, but I speculate it may be faster.

A lot of the current relative isolation of China in quantum technologies is due to concerted pressure from the Biden administration, largely getting European countries and other international partners on board with quantum export controls. As Washington deemphasizes multilateral approaches and Europe starts to derisk not just from Chinese, but also (albeit to a lesser extent) American quantum dependencies, the “quantum embargo” on China might soften over the next few years.

Are we setting the scene for a “Second China Shock”?

With Chinese policy makers laser-focused on technological upgrading and building the industries of the future, some are warning of a “Second China Shock”17. The first China Shock refers to the loss of manufacturing in the West following China’s reform and opening up period; the second China Shock refers to China contesting the innovative and high-value sectors that power advanced Western economies. The consequences to Western economies and security underpinnings could be devastating.

In quantum, however, these consequences are not (yet) imminent. On the commercial front, Chinese players are largely walled off from the Western ecosystem by export controls, visa restrictions, and political interventions that ensure few partnerships take place.

I worry what this looming bifurcation means for the sector going forward.

At the same time, I worry what it means for the West if this artificial divide crumbles under the pressure of international market competition. Are Western quantum start-ups and supply chain SMEs ready to compete with and, in some cases, rapidly adapt and learn from a Chinese quantum ecosystem they currently wouldn’t touch with a ten-foot pole? By treating China as a “no-go” zone to avoid political backlash, are they missing out on critical market intelligence and innovation partnerships?

Will Western policymakers be able to grapple with an ecosystem that turns out different from what they always told themselves? Will Western policymakers eventually realize that their walls succeeded in protecting IP, only to fail at capturing the market?

The answers will determine whether China Shock 2.0 eventually hits the quantum sector.

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To understand what quantum is in China’s plans, it helps to understand what it isn’t (yet).

What it is not: Quantum is not (yet) a Strategic Emerging Industry

Strategic Emerging Industries (SEIs) are the key pillars of China’s economic transition to a new model. These industries are already emerging and have a clear path to realizing real productivity gains and economic impact. They are all “high-tech” and hence high-value-add. While FYP14 specified nine concrete areas, the FYP15 recommendations list four clusters: New Energy, New Materials, Aerospace, and the Low-Altitude Economy. The “three new” that already drive massive export growth in China–new energy vehicles (NEVs), lithium-ion batteries, and PV cells–fall into these clusters.

Quantum technology clearly does not belong to this category: It is not yet a sector of the real economy that noticeably drives growth. Rather, it is a Future Industry, the foundations of which are currently being laid across the world thanks to generous government spending and VC support.

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“Quantum internet” is a buzzword, farther off and more vague in its impact than even fault-tolerant quantum computing. The long-term vision is one of “unconditionally” secure communication, quantum computers interconnected through quantum networking infrastructure, and global-scale quantum sensing arrays.

A recent talk by Professor Jian-Wei Pan on quantum networks helped me get a much more concrete understanding of where we are in this fuzzy vision and had me marvel at the technology demonstrations expected over the next 5-10 years. His talk outlined a vision for quantum communications that goes through, but beyond, scaling quantum key distribution with satellite networks and quantum repeaters, building on accumulated quantum networking technology to realize distributed quantum sensing advantages and new tests for the laws of nature. It strengthened my optimism that quantum networks will be a key building block of the 21st-century information infrastructure.

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I just attended the QCrypt quantum cryptography conference in Sanya, China. On a personal level, this conference was fantastic to get up to speed with recent developments and meet some people in the field. After two years at Peking University studying policy aspects of quantum technologies, my next career step is back to more technical work in quantum cryptography.

For this blog, which is more about big picture developments than technical details, I want to share my takes on Professor Jian-Wei Pan’s public lecture on the evening of the third day. I was very impressed not just by the upcoming experimental achievements of his megagroup1, but even more so by the decade+ vision he outlined for quantum networks. Given his track record, this vision matters: Professor Pan is not just a distinguished scientist that with all kinds of accolades and record-breaking achievements, but he has also been the main public visionary and administrator behind China’s quantum roadmap, directly endorsed by Xi Jinping and heading China’s National Quantum Laboratory.

Before I get into his talk, let me give a shoutout to the organisers of QCrypt. It was a great conference. While I often write about quantum through the lens of underlying politics and fragmentation in the technological landscape, this conference was a good reminder that most researchers still primarily care about good ideas and openly discuss their work and methods. Politics takes a distant background. While I don’t think that scientists can or should be completely detached from politics, the collaborative spirit of pushing a field forward is very admirable in academia. Next year’s QCrypt will be in Ottawa, Canada; maybe I can make it again.

Now, let me summarize my thoughts on professor Pan’s talk.

On a high level, the incredible technological and scientific success of Pan’s megagroup is a for me a story of:

1. Persistent persistent pursuit of long-term objectives. For example, Pan shared that around 2003, he realized that building quantum memories–needed for long-distance secure quantum communication–is extremely hard. Hence, he started looking for more efficient ways. One solution he settled on was using free-space communication with quantum satellites, which was famously realized with the Micius satellite 13 years later. Of course, this doesn’t mean professor Pan gave up on quantum memories. Indeed, he presented two breakthroughs that I will talk about below. Still, the journey is far from over: He expects a practical quantum repeater at 1000 km scale to be feasible in 5-10 years.

2. Strategic accumulation of know-how. This refers to the many sequential achievements and technologies developed by Pan’s megagroup that build on top of each other. For the Micius satellite, Professor Pan outlined a decade-long journey of ground tests supported by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) since 2003, with the first free space tests in 2005.2 The *strategic* approach to some of this accumulation is definitely not without controversies. For example, Pan’s time in Heidelberg, Germany, which he leveraged to cultivate capabilities in cold atom quantum memories at USTC, has been framed by some Western analysts as an “exploitation of Western government funding.”3 Ditto for hiring Chinese researchers from abroad through “talent plans” and the surrounding controversies.

3. Interdisciplinary integration. With research activities covering nearly all quantum technologies, accumulated know-how is not siloed up, but enables breakthroughs in adjacent fields. For example, Pan highlights how they made use of multi-photon interferometry technologies developed for quantum communications in building photonic quantum computing prototypes (the “Jiuzhang” quantum computers). In 2020, this famously culminated in the world’s second quantum computing advantage experiment. This interdisciplinary integration is supported by productizing technological building blocks (through the company QuantumCTek and others) and through large interdisciplinary flagship projects.

4. Flagship projects. Large technological achievements that mobilize China’s vast engineering resources and broad scientific excellence for experimental breakthroughs or large-scale applications. Past examples include the Micius satellite and the national Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) long-distance backbone network, now stretching more than 10’000 km. The prospects here are truly dazzling, with Pan mentioning a quantum satellite constellation, a large geostationary quantum satellite (2027/28) and various applications of quantum networking technology to sensing: Ultra-precise time synchronisation at global scales, quantum-enhanced telescope arrays and, in 10-15 years, outer space experiments such as for the detection of gravitational waves at low frequencies. (More on these below.)

Professor Pan’s talk first summarised the development of quantum key distribution, with a special emphasis on the two challenges of practical security (fixing side-channels that come from imperfect implementation of theoretically secure protocols) and extending the range of quantum communication. After presenting recent achievements in quantum repeaters and Jiuzhang 4.0, he gave an overview of applications and future roadmaps for quantum networks.

Note, that the talk focused on quantum communications and adjacent technologies. Hence, while photonic quantum computing was mentioned as well as the possibility of connecting quantum computers through a “quantum internet,” no updates were given on other quantum computing modalities pursued by Pan’s group, such as the recent neutral atoms record or progress in quantum error correction on the Zuchongzhi superconducting quantum computing platform.

The missing building block: Quantum repeaters

This section is a tiny bit technical; if you just want to know about the applications, you can skip to the next section on applications and prospects.

Current quantum communication technology still faces significant limitations in range and (for cryptography applications) practical security. Optical communication in fibres is range-limited by photon loss. For example, commercial quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations are generally limited by photon loss to around 100 km. Securely generating keys beyond that range requires a chain of trusted nodes, which increases cost and can present security issues. New protocols such as Twin-Field QKD or mode-pairing QKD push this range closer to 500 or even 1000 kilometres, but don't change the fundamental limitation from fibre loss.

Transmitting quantum signals through free space instead of fibres is one partial solution. This motivated the Micius satellite, launched in 2016 and demonstrating satellite-enabled QKD at over 1’000 kilometres. In 2022, Pan’s megagroup followed up with a miniaturised version, Jinan-1, which demonstrated QKD at over 10’000 kilometres. Currently, soon a decade after Micius was launched, multiple other countries are close to first demonstrations of quantum satellites. However, unlike the Micius satellite, which directly distributed entangled photon pairs, Jinan-1 and many other projects only communicate with one ground station at a time, acting as a “space postman” – that is, a trusted node.

In theory, the requirement for trusted nodes and limitations on range can be completely overcome with quantum repeaters. In classical communications, weak signals can be “replenished” by signal repeaters that read out the incoming signal and resend an amplified version. However, this is impossible in quantum cryptography whose security relies on the “no-cloning” property of quantum mechanics, i.e. the inability to just read out and copy an incoming quantum signal. One way around this is with trusted nodes: If A and C are 200km apart but can only reasonably establish secure keys at a distance of 100km, let’s just place a third party, B, in the middle. Then, A and C can both establish secure connections with B, using him as a man-in-the-middle. But what if we don’t want to trust a man-in-the-middle?

Quantum teleportation provides an alternative quantum method to overcome the need for trusted nodes. The basic idea is that you can again use a man-in-the-middle B, which is “entangled” with both A and C, to create entanglement with A and C instead through “entanglement swapping”. (Entanglement, in turn, can be used for QKD. It is also a crucial “resource” to many other quantum communication applications.)

The great thing about quantum mechanics (more specifically, Bell non-locality) is that, unlike in the classical case, A and C do not have to trust B. As long as the local statistics at the endpoints A and B fulfil some well-defined requirements, we can be assured that no man-in-the-middle, no matter how powerful, ends up with any information about the created keys. Intuitively, quantum entanglement is “monogamous”, that is, you can only be perfectly entangled with one party at a time.

This is connected to something called “self-testing” and “device independence“ in quantum technologies. These are incredibly powerful: Based merely on output statistics of two spatially separated “blackbox devices”, the inner workings of these devices can be characterised to work as intended. As long as quantum mechanics is correct (and complete), we can have truly unconditional security no matter how malicious the manufacturer of our devices, how powerful our adversary or how clumsy the intern who calibrated our photon source … – that’s the idea; of course, if you dig deeper, there are still some assumptions left (e.g. related to isolation of the devices during operation, free will of the operators, or locality loopholes).

In a nutshell, quantum repeaters are the technological building block that allows for entanglement swapping. Hence, quantum repeaters can help us to overcome both range limitations as well as practical security issues by allowing device-independent protocols (DI-QKD). Beyond QKD, quantum repeaters can create entanglement between spatially separated parties, with applications to quantum computing and sensing.

Progress towards quantum repeaters

Apparently (I am a theorist, so I wouldn’t know), building quantum repeaters is quite hard. It requires:

1. Quantum memories: The ability to preserve stationary quantum states intact for a “long” period of time, called lifetime. To make quantum memories useful, you also need to be able to read and write your memory and ideally interconvert your stationary memory (e.g. state of atoms) efficiently with “flying” quantum information (photons). For example, you may want to tell your quantum memory, “Please swap your stored quantum state to the polarization of a photon and emit that photon.” Hopefully, the quantum memory does as told with high probability, called retrieval efficiency.

2. Entangling the quantum memory with a photon: You want to send out photons that are entangled with the state of your quantum memory.

3. Entangling measurement: You want to perform a joint entangling “Bell state measurement” on two incoming photons (needed for the entanglement swapping step in the figure above).

Ideally, once entanglement is established between two distant parties A and C, you would like to “purify” that entanglement, basically using lots of “bad” entanglement to get a few copies of near-perfect Bell states. In summary: Entanglement swapping/quantum teleportation for establishing a “connection”, entanglement purification for cleaning up the connection.

The basic idea of quantum repeaters can be written down in a few lines on a blackboard. But again, making this happen with actual hardware is really hard. Luckily, Professor Pan has been working on this for over two decades. As seen in his slide below, the two metrics “quantum memory lifetime” and “retrieval efficiency” have undergone significant improvements over the years: From 1µs lifetime and 35% retrieval efficiency in 2008 to 220ms lifetime (>5 orders of magnitude improvement!) with 76% retrieval efficiency in 2017.

Now, all this work seems to start paying off. To build a working quantum repeater prototype, Pan’s megagroup simultaneously pursued two quantum memory architectures (because why not): One based on trapped ions, the other one on neutral atoms (both papers appear to be still in preparation). In both cases, the teams successfully established entanglement between quantum memories separated by 100km and used this to demonstrate device-independent QKD (DI-QKD)!

I am no authority on this, but I think that while this isn’t the first time DI-QKD was experimentally demonstrated, it is the first time it was demonstrated beyond a few 100s of meters in lab settings.4

Once this crucial building block matures–according to Pan, it might need another 5-10 years for practical quantum repeaters at 1000km distances–then distributing entanglement across large distances becomes practically feasible. I can’t overemphasise how important this step is towards the dream of a “quantum internet”: Networked quantum computers, large-scale distributed quantum sensing and quantum-secure communication.

On the way there, Pan’s megagroup already has some amazing applications in the pipeline. I will summarise what he shared in the next section.

Applications and prospects

What flagship projects are in the pipeline?

Space-based quantum network enabler: Quantum satellites

As many teams across the world race to complete their first quantum satellite, the Pan megagroup is looking to deploy a whole satellite constellation (3-4) as well as a large geo-stationary quantum satellite (scheduled for launch late 2027 / early 2028).

Given that Chinese QKD systems are export-controlled, it will be interesting to see when and where Chinese equipment appears in international markets and which countries will be willing, and allowed to, adopt or interoperate with Chinese quantum networking technology.

A practical satellite network and talk of intercontinental quantum key distribution sounds quite international to me. Likewise for the GEO quantum satellite, which is a step towards directly distributing entanglement over truly intercontinental distances (thanks to having a simultaneous line of sight to a large part of the earth).

Professor Pan did mention international collaborations with regard to quantum satellites, hoping to test the feasibility of an international quantum network. I was quite surprised to see India appear on the slide (although no specifics were mentioned on the ongoing collaborations).

Precise global timesharing, redefining the “second”

Besides free-space QKD, all that quantum satellite and networking tech can also be leveraged to synchronize extremely precise optical atomic clocks over long distances. This sounds very esoteric at first, but as I read more about it, this increasingly feels highly relevant.5

Precise time synchronization is very important for the modern information economy, underlying the functioning of Navigation (GPS, BaiDou …), stock markets, telecom networks, electric grids and science experiments.

On a technical level, two developments might make global time synchronization four orders of magnitude more precise, resulting in a redefinition of the SI unit for time itself: (1) More precise atomic clocks making use of optical frequencies (instead of microwave), which are “off less than a second in billions of years” and (2) the ability to synchronize clocks at different locations through “free-space optical frequency transfer”.6

Will this added precision really be a game-changer? On the science side, it might enable new tests of relativity and other physical theories and conjectures.

Is it also directly relevant towards improving more “practical” capabilities? I don’t know, but I would be surprised if it wasn’t, being a new generation of infrastructure for more precise global time synchronization, a capability that already underpins much of today's information infrastructure.

More speculatively, similar to how GPS was an American monopoly for the first decades, the future enabling space infrastructure for high-precision time sharing looks likely to be Chinese.

What is the connection to quantum technologies? Quantum communication itself requires very precise time synchronization between distant users. Furthermore, the optical frequency atomic clocks in question are, in a sense, a quantum sensor (of time). Pan’s megagroup has both built leading atomic clocks and is the global leader in advancing quantum communication. While my understanding is that the currently planned approach to time synchronization is not strictly speaking quantum technology, it would likely make use of shared infrastructure (e.g. the GEO quantum satellite) and similar technologies. In the future, it could possibly be even further improved by leveraging special quantum states or entanglement.

Quantum-enhanced telescope

A more direct use case of quantum networking technologies, in particular quantum repeaters, is the quantum-enhanced telescope. Pan’s megagroup is working on a “small” prototype in Xinjiang.

The basic idea is as follows: One way to analyze light coming from a distant star is to interfere light that arrives from the same object at different locations. The cool thing about this technique is that, theoretically, light could be collected at different telescopes far apart from each other, creating a very large “virtual telescope.”

In principle, you can have such a virtual telescope with an Earth-sized aperture. Apparently, this is quite feasible for radio telescopy (and was the technique that famously created an image of a black hole a few years ago). However, for signals in optical frequencies, this only works at smaller scales. The challenges are similar to those of scaling quantum communication: Loss in fibres and the need for lots of difficult compensation technologies.

However, quantum repeaters can help: Instead of interfering individual photons by routing them to a central location, we teleport their quantum mechanical state to a central location and then interfere those!

Once you have a global “quantum internet”, allowing you to reliably distribute entanglement, then, in principle, you can have a telescope interferometer at global scales. Quantum-enhanced global metrology piggybacking on general-purpose quantum internet infrastructure!

Beyond earth

Why stop at global scales? If you bring quantum networking infrastructure and quantum sensing arrays to outer space (10-15 years), you may get an additional two orders of magnitude in your time precision and test our laws of physics (and discover new ones!) at unprecedented scales. For example, you could detect a “different category” of gravitational waves than is possible with existing earthly platforms.

What a future.

This is the first China∩Quantum Brief. I am thinking of doing these roughly once a month. Let me know what I missed and how this could be more useful for you!

The first section (1) links the latest funding rounds of Chinese quantum computing start-ups in neutral atoms, photonics, and superconducting/spin qubits. QuantumCTek also reported its results for the first half of 2025.

On the policy side (2), there are quantum standards updates and a flurry of initiatives by the Beijing and Sichuan local governments.

Finally (3), the widely reported neutral atom record by a USTC-Shanghai AI Lab collab.

(1) Industry Updates

• [Funding round, Jul 23] CAS Cold Atoms (中科酷原) raises “tens of millions” CNY in strategic financing.

  • Wuhan-based, working on neutral atom quantum computing (Hanyuan-1, 100+ qubits)

  • Investors (I think besides Richinfo all are local government): XinGuang Quantum Fund (芯光量子基金), Guanggu Angel Fund (光谷天使基金), Hubei Science and Technology Investment Angel Fund (湖北科投天使基金), Richinfo (彩讯股份)

  • [This seems to have nothing to do with the widely reported neutral atoms record by the USTC-Shanghai AI Lab collab, see (3) below.]

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• [Funding round, Jul 22] TuringQ (图灵量子) raised 100 million CNY in its fifth round of financing and signed orders worth 100 million CNY in the first half of 2025

  • Shanghai-based, working on photonic quantum computing, DV (discrete variable), I think. Full stack, including algorithms (especially AI-related)

  • Round led by Prosperity Investment (盛世投资), fund-of-funds and government-guided funds management

    

• [Funding round, Jul 22] SpinQ (量旋科技) completed Series B, raising “several hundred million” CNY.

  • Shenzhen-based, working on NMR quantum computers for education purposes and full-stack superconducting quantum computing

  • Currently developing a 100-qubit superconducting chip, successfully exported a (smaller?) superconducting chip overseas (Middle East, I think, UAE)

  • Investors: Jianxin Equity (建信股权, central gov.), Liangxi Science and Technology City Development Fund (梁溪科技城发展基金, local gov.), Xingkong Investment / StarSky Capital (星空投资, private), Huaqiang Capital (华强资本, private), Jiusong Fund (九颂基金, private)

  • Claims that “currently, the company's products and services have reached over 200 universities, enterprises, and research institutions in more than 40 countries and regions.” I assume mostly referring to its education products. You can add the Philippines to the map below, which acquired its first quantum computer (2-qubit Gemini NMR, ~50k USD) from SpinQ recently. (The desktop-size educational device was showcased at the great QISTCon.ph conference in Cebu City, where I had the pleasure of playing around with it.)

    

• [Product update, Aug 07] QBoson (玻色量子) unveiled Quantum Boltzmann Machine and an open-source programming kit.

  • Beijing-based, developing photonic quantum computers. They seem focused on specialized applications, especially AI, rather than building a universal photonic quantum computer

  • (A Boltzmann machine is just a specific neural network; I guess QBoson’s Quantum Boltzmann Machine implements this concept on quantum hardware)

• [Product update, Aug 11] Unitary Quantum (幺正量子) completed the assembly and commissioning of China's first 4K low-temperature QCCD chip-type ion trap quantum computing system

  • I guess this is a similar approach to the one Quantinuum is pursuing

  • Hefei-based, working on trapped ion quantum computing

Listed Quantum companies

• QuantumCTek (国盾量子) reports H1 2025: This is probably China’s most important quantum company.1 The publicly listed (Shanghai STAR Market) quantum company is a core part of China’s quantum “national team” (国家队). It reported a revenue of 121.37 million CNY (74.54% YoY) with a net loss of 23.79 million CNY and R&D expenses of 55.17 million CNY (first half of 2025). For comparison, that is a bit less than IonQ’s revenue for a single quarter but significantly more than Rigetti or D-Wave.

  • It was interesting to me that quantum computing (rather than only QKD sales) contributed significantly to QuantumCTek’s revenue, 55.96 million CNY (283.92% YoY). The company will export a 25-qubit superconducting quantum computer abroad2 and is installing platforms with 100s of qubits domestically.

  • Quantum communications-related revenue was 51.73 million CNY (28.10% YoY), including for QKD, quantum satellite ground stations and QRNG.

  • Quantum measurement-related revenue was 8.57 million CNY (13.75% YoY), with this vertical including cold atoms gravimeters (2 delivered to customers) and single photon imaging prototypes.

  • I was surprised how small the company’s R&D team is (if compared to other leading Chinese quantum start-ups like CIQTEK, especially the PhD count): 13 PhD, 76 master, 132 undergraduate and 3 with college degree. This is “collaborative innovation between industry, academia, research and application” (产学研用协同创新) in action, with much of the original IP coming from the large quantum research groups associated with the company at USTC. QuantumCTek itself is probably just the tip of the iceberg, productizing and distributing this IP.

  • Since the beginning of 2025, ChinaTelecom3 is the controlling shareholder.

• Kyushu Quantum (九州量子) is asked uncomfortable questions: There is a lot of controversy surrounding Kyushu Quantum. Founded quite early in 2012, listed4 at NEEQ in 2016, at some point reaching nearly 30 billion CNY in valuation—mostly erased after significant reputational damage from a spat with QuantumCTek (that involved criminal charges) and a collapsed partnership with ID Quantique. I mention it here because of a revealing recent inquiry letter from NEEQ into its 2024 annual report. It raises concerns about the company’s continued capacity to operate after a revenue collapse of nearly 75% (down to 13.75 million CNY), a layoff of 89 people (down to 49, with 29 R&D personnel), high dependency on a few large customers and questions about finances and inventory. Sad.

(2) Quantum Policy News

National

• [Standards, Jul 29-30] The third centralized meeting of the Quantum Information Standards Working Group (TC 28/WG 34) of the National Information Technology Standardization Technical Committee, 62 representatives from 25 units, four main meetings:

  • Basic Special Topic Group: Discussed the quantum information standardization roadmap and post-quantum cryptography research from China Mobile Internet (中移互联网).

  • Technology Special Topic Group: Discussed quantum computing software standards and reviewed proposals on error mitigation and hybrid computing from the Information Engineering University (信息工程大学) and China Mobile (Suzhou) Software Technology (中移（苏州）软件技术).

  • Application Special Topic Group: Explored application paths and standardization for quantum technology in AI and other vertical industries.

  • Product Special Topic Group: Discussed the quantum product ecosystem and reviewed hardware standard proposals like quantum low-temperature devices, chip packaging boxes, chip production lines, computer purification systems and others proposed by Chengdu ZWDX Technology (成都中微达信科技), AVIC Jonhon Optronic Technology (中航光电科技), and the CETC 2nd & 33rd Research Institutes (中国电子科技集团公司第二研究所、第三十三研究所).

• [Standards, Aug 01] Four recommended quantum standards5 (call for comments by SAC/TC 578, a national committee on quantum computing and measurement standards):

  1. Performance test of quantum computing system

  2. Quantum computing service platform—Part 1: Architecture and functional requirements

  3. Quantum computing service platform—Part 2: Performance evaluation

  4. Ultra-low temperature and Ultra-low noise platform for superconducting quantum computing

Local

• Beijing Quantum Industry Ecological Innovation Conference and the Sixth Plenary Session of the Quantum Information Network Industry Alliance—A lot of jargon and stuff being announced, but here are my and my LLM’s main takeaways:

  • Quantum Information Network Industry Alliance (量子信息网络产业联盟, QIIA) has now more than 100 members—Yay! (I think this is the closest thing to the US QED-C and EU QuIC there is in China; it’s initiated by CAICT of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology)

  • Four major innovation platforms announced:

    • Quantum-AI Collaborative Innovation Consortium (量子-AI协同创新联合体): A group led by the CETC Electronic Science Research Institute to develop novel algorithms that merge quantum computing and AI for applications in finance, transportation, and materials science.

    • Beijing Quantum Computing Industry Innovation Center (北京量子计算产业创新中心): Focused on building the software and application ecosystem. It will develop a multi-platform quantum software stack, create a quantum-classical hybrid cloud platform for computing power, and drive the application of quantum computing in sectors like biomedicine and finance.

    • Quantum Information Patent Pool (量子信息专利池): An initiative to centralize core patents from top research institutions and companies. The goal is to streamline licensing, lower R&D costs for businesses, and accelerate the conversion of research into commercial products.

    • "Quantum Constellation" New Quality Industry Ecosystem Community ('量子星座'新质产业生态社区): A physical and virtual hub located in the Tongming Lake area. It aims to bring together researchers, developers, and industry pioneers to support the entire innovation chain, from basic research and incubation to full-scale industrial application.

  • Representative Beijing-based quantum enterprises that attended: Huayi Quantum (华翊量子; trapped ion quantum computing), ArcLight Quantum (弧光量子 / 中科弧光; quantum computing software), Liangyi Wanxiang (两仪万象; neutral atom quantum computing), QBoson (玻色量子; photonic quantum computing), Coherent (相干科技; superconducting quantum computing)

  • Lots of quantum-specific policy support measures (government-guided fund, talent plan, start-up incubation plan)6

• Sichuan Quantum Technology Industry Breakthrough Development Action Plan announced during a CCF conference in Chengdu. According to the local news report:

  • Subsidies, special bonds, and guidance funds: Quantum technology projects are now eligible for major funding programs that offer subsidies of up to 30% (max 10 million CNY) or 40% (max 20 million CNY). Furthermore, Sichuan has included quantum technology within the scope of local government special bonds (地方政府专项债) to accelerate the growth of quantum enterprises and the construction of quantum industrial parks. The province will also use its industrial investment guidance funds to encourage more market-driven investment in the sector.

  • The plan, led by the local dept. for economy and information technology (interestingly not the local science and tech dept. as the main driver), aims to make Sichuan a national pilot zone for quantum innovation by 2030.7

  • Building on existing infrastructure and breakthroughs: "Chengdu-Chongqing trunk line" (成渝干线) quantum communication backbone network, the Chengdu metropolitan network, a commercial quantum satellite ground station and breakthroughs in quantum clocks, quantum magnetometers, quantum gravimeters, quantum radars, and quantum inertial navigation systems.

  • Building on the strengths of key local enterprises such as Chengdu ZWDX Technology (中微达信), ChinaNetSec (中国网安), Tian-ao Electronics (天奥电子), and others.

  • The plan calls for a provincial manufacturing innovation centre and a provincial quantum technology industry association to consolidate resources and collaboration.

(3) Technical Highlights

This section only contains one reference, mostly because without diving into the details (for which I don’t have time), I don’t feel comfortable being the one judging which ones of the many daily quantum papers deserve a mention.

• Control system for 2024 neutral atoms, global record with reported fidelities competitive with Harvard/QuEra (PRL paper/ArXiv preprint; English news report). The USTC-Shanghai8 AI Lab collab overcomes a bottleneck in scaling neutral atom quantum computers, basically leveraging AI to quickly (60ms) assemble two thousand qubits. Impressive technical achievement that has been widely reported internationally. I am not an expert on this and haven’t talked to one—so let me just say that while this seems to be a very important step towards large-scale quantum computing with neutral atoms, there are caveats as always. For example, there are remaining constraints in the 3D arrangement of atoms. Of course, there are also many more steps beyond the initialisation (this work) of an atom array to do error correction and useful quantum computations on these 2000+ qubits.

Interesting reads

Interesting reads across which I stumbled, in addition to the news updates above.

• I enjoyed reading this news report about Changsha’s9 nascent quantum ecosystem. A short article that talks about the progress to date and plans for the local Quantum R&D Centre. What I liked about it is that it makes abstract jargon10 more tangible thanks to the specific examples. Also, before, I knew next to nothing about quantum in Changsha.

The commentary takes around 10 min to read and I recommend you to check it out on RUSI’s website. If you are in a hurry here is an incomplete summary of the basic argument:

1. Export controls, which escalated in 2024, have temporarily disrupted China’s quantum hardware and talent development. However, they are also supercharging localization efforts (“aligning demand with supply”) and accelerating China’s development of an independent quantum supply chain.

2. These domestic Chinese suppliers—especially those providing upstream components and specialized equipment—are likely to export to Europe. This is driven by factors such as local government competition, the marketing value of international clients, and a relatively permissive (even incentivizing) political environment.

3. This presents risks to Europe’s ambitions for tech sovereignty, but also significant opportunities. For example, a proactive approach to Chinese exports and business partnerships could open pathways for the diffusion of knowledge and best practices from an increasingly competitive (but, from a European perspective, often considered insular) Chinese quantum ecosystem.

A comment on the commentary:

The second point above runs counter to common Western narratives of a heavily securitized and deliberately insular Chinese quantum ecosystem. Indeed, it remains interesting to watch where the Chinese policy pendulum will settle between “quantum as a future industry” and “quantum as a national security issue.” I argue that, currently, the former is dominant in China, while the latter dominates US and, to an extent, UK discussions.

What about the EU? I had a cursory look at the recently published (2 July 2025) EU quantum strategy. It strongly frames quantum as an economic priority for Europe’s future, acknowledging the lagging “translation” of scientific prowess into market opportunities and well-funded start-ups as well as fragmentation of efforts. It also promises some measures that vaguely reminded me of existing Chinese “quantum industrial policy” (e.g. Quantum Grand Challenges, Quantum Sensing Roadmap, scientific infrastructure buildout, MSCA Choose Europe scheme, etc.).

On the other hand, regarding security, the strategy emphasizes strategic autonomy—secure supply chains, European infrastructure, independence from third-country regulations—and the protection of IP. While focussing on the UK, my commentary is thus also directly relevant to EU efforts to map supply chain vulnerabilities (under the ongoing Quantum Technology Risk Assessment) and to security considerations in inbound investment controls. I hope it can contribute to these debates, creating awareness of both future dependency risks as well as opportunities for diffusion and a more diverse supplier base.

I summarise and discuss it below. I found the framing, the discussion about the impact of US controls on China (section (3)) and the challenges to future US leadership in quantum (section (4)) highly relevant.

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First, disclaimers:

• The article extensively cites English sources; in fact, a Xinhua readout on the 2020 Politburo session on quantum is the only Chinese source! I think this may partly be because it was published in an American Studies journal, and partly editorial policy/self-censoring to avoid sharing any Chinese content that could be considered sensitive. The article talks a lot about US initiatives, restrictions and wider motivations. It does make some very relevant points in this regard, and, given the well-regarded journal and affiliation, I would hope that it is representative of Chinese analysts’ framing/perspective on US actions.

  The piece also includes interesting bits about quantum in China—especially the effect of the US’ “containment network”—, but without sources and with less detail than discussions on the US.

• Quotes are machine-translated; I take no responsibility for accuracy.

Here we go; everything in regular font attempts to accurately represent the views of the article, while my own takes and interpretations are in italic.

(1) Why the quantum competition?

Three main reasons for US-China competition in quantum information technology:

1. The strategic value of quantum information technology: “[…] will greatly promote economic transformation and industrial upgrading, and have an impact on national military and information security.”

   1. The typical: Big future market for quantum computing, quantum sensing already commercially available with many military implications, quantum communications with QKD2 and QRNG3 in “commercial preparation stage.”

   2. Quantum computing poses a severe challenge to traditional information security, and “quantum communication, as a ‘shield’ for information security, can effectively counter the ‘spear’ of quantum computing.” This would be less common to read in the US, where the focus is more on PQC4. In fact, PQC is only mentioned once in the article in the context of incompatibilities between the US and its allies (see discussion at the end of section (4)).

2. Strategic competition (between the US and China since 2017, but also more broadly in quantum with many government initiatives globally) and efforts by the US to decouple from China in the digital economy

3. US’ competitive anxiety (竞争焦虑) about Chinese progress: “China's continuous improvement in this field and the Chinese government's high attention and systematic layout of quantum technology have aroused deep concerns in the United States, prompting it to intensify competition with China in order to maintain its own technological leadership.”

   This has been deepened by:

   1. Increasing practical application of quantum, e.g. “critical turning point in realising application, and the era of uncertainty in quantum computing has ended.” (Although the author acknowledges that “industry estimates that it will take another 10 to 15 years to produce a quantum computer that can solve various problems.”)

   2. “[…] China's growing strength in quantum technology has deepened the United States' sense of crisis.” China is globally the only country that can challenge the US. The author highlights breakthroughs in the generation of cluster states on a photonic quantum chip (Feb. 2025) and the Zu Chongzhi III supercomputing chip (March 2025). (Dates refer to publication in peer-reviewed journals)

   3. “[…] Chinese government's strategic determination to seize the commanding heights of science and technology […]” The author references the 2020 Politburo study session on quantum, quantum as key technology (关键技术) in 14th Five-Year Plan and its appearance in many other policy documents, and the March 2025 announcement of a large VC guidance fund (for quantum, AI and other fields).

   4. US reservations about China’s approach to technology development: “[the US] slanders (污蔑) China for investing a lot of resources in seeking global technological leadership through ‘authoritarian’ means such as stealing technology, forcing companies to disclose intellectual property rights, and disrupting free and fair markets […]”

(2) What has the US done so far?

No one strategic document on quantum competition, but the National Security Strategies of 2017 and 2022 and the National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies of 2020 outline the US view:

• 2017: China is declared a “strategic competitor”

• 2020: “[…] U.S. government’s list of critical emerging technologies, claiming that ‘the United States’ leadership in science and technology faces challenges from strategic competitors […]”

• 2022: “[…] proposed that China is a “systemic competitor” of the United States, and that ‘technology is at the core of today’s geopolitical competition and at the core of the United States’ security, economy, and democratic future’ […]”, quantum among a range of fields singled out for US leadership and deeper cooperation with allies.

What the US is doing to win the competition:

1. Blockade (or containment network, 包围网): “In general, the United States' quantum competition policy toward China is mainly aimed at curbing China's key technology development and adopts strong blockade measures.”

   1. Export controls and entity listings

   2. “[…] various measures to restrict Chinese quantum companies and research institutions from cooperating with relevant American and even international institutions.” This is followed by a few interesting remarks (without citation): “As early as the end of 2022, IBM had already refused Chinese IP access to its cloud-based quantum computing platform (IBM Quantum Exploration), which directly resulted in Chinese researchers being unable to use IBM quantum computers for scientific research experiments. In addition, the US government has also restricted academic exchanges between China and the United States through visa restrictions (increasing the rejection rate and delaying the processing of visa applications).”

   3. Working with allies to build a “de-Sinicized” quantum supply chain “to ensure that key components such as quantum computing chips, cryogenic cooling systems, and high-end photonic materials do not flow to China.”

2. “Whole-of-government” approach (this is indeed the official wording at the NQI) to promote quantum in the US, cooperation between academia, industry and government. Main initiatives: National Quantum Initiative Act (NQIA), CHIPS and Science Act

3. “Strengthening quantum technology cooperation among allies and building a global strategic alliance” based on national security, values, and a common economic vision (referring to Biden-era documents, now less clear, see section (4) below).

   1. Bilateral joint statements, AUKUS Quantum Arrangement

   2. Leading role in international standardisation, especially the ISO/IEC JTC 3-Quantum Technologies committee: “[…] the United States and its allies are leading the discussion on quantum technology standards in the International Organisation for Standardisation, making early arrangements to gain the right to speak and formulate quantum technology standards.” The piece is relatively tame here. For more direct (Western) criticism of US political intervention in quantum standards to sideline China, see this commentary.

   3. Global networks by US companies (e.g. IBM) and research institutes

(3) What is the impact on China’s quantum ecosystem?

Overall, the effects of US efforts on China have been a mix of short-term hindrances and a long-term acceleration of China's push for self-reliance.

Negative impacts:

• Export controls have had an impact: Supply chain disruption, difficulties in obtaining core technologies, adding challenges to quantum hardware R&D, and impacting talent training

  • US controls related to advanced chips and their manufacturing equipment are highlighted as particularly disruptive. “Since semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced chips are upstream products of the quantum information technology industry chain and are the basic hardware for the development of quantum information technology, restricting the export of these products will largely restrict China's technological breakthroughs.” I find this interesting, as discussions of chips controls usually center around AI. But indeed, not just silicon-based quantum computing, but also superconducting quantum computing (among the most popular and most advanced approaches) relies critically on semiconductor manufacturing processes, including lithography. The restriction of advanced Nvidia GPUs was also mentioned as relevant to quantum computing. I assume the author sees the relevance either in classical simulation of quantum computers (using GPUs) or in classical-quantum integrations (with fast classical operations required for quantum error correction, for example).

  • Entity listings constrained hardware iteration: “After QuantumCTek and Origin Quantum were sanctioned by the United States, it has been difficult [for them] to obtain advanced superconducting chip manufacturing technology, which has constrained the iteration and update of quantum computing hardware.”

  • Impact on talent training from quantum computing export controls: “[…] the US restriction on the export of quantum computing prototypes has hindered the training of students in the field of quantum information science in Chinese universities.” This one is quite interesting. I assume it refers to platforms like this one from Infleqtion: a turnkey quantum computing prototype that can be used to train students with cold-atom experiments. I am not an experimentalist, but I assume that building and calibrating a setup like that from scratch could easily take a year and doesn’t scale well for training purposes.

• Isolation of China from quantum technology cooperation and exchanges:

  • “As early as the end of 2022, IBM had already denied Chinese IP access to its cloud-based quantum computing platform (IBM Quantum Experience), which directly resulted in Chinese researchers being unable to use IBM quantum computers for scientific research experiments.”

  • “[…] the US government has also restricted academic exchanges between China and the United States through visa restrictions (increasing the rejection rate and delaying the processing of visa applications).” E.g. in connection with this 2020 executive proclamation.

    There are also instances of US-based Chinese researchers/students being unable to return to the US after a trip to China, with a negative effect on “China's ability to cultivate top quantum technology talents.”

The more optimistic view for China:

• The negative impact on China will be temporary: “Since Chinese companies have not formed a key dependence on the United States in terms of quantum technology and key components, research and development can still circumvent the US export control on related quantum computing items through alternative solutions.” I think this is indeed a difference to the deeper and more specialised semiconductor supply chain, where dependencies and ecosystems have formed over decades on the basis of US-controlled IP.

• US controls accelerate Chinese self-reliance efforts: “In the long run, the US containment strategy not only limits the development space of its own quantum technology industry in the Chinese market, but will also accelerate China's independent research and development process in this field.”

  This is already happening: “In the past two years, China's domestic quantum chips have made breakthroughs, some quantum research institutions have accelerated the promotion of domestic substitution technologies, and related equipment (such as dilution refrigerators) have continued to upgrade and replace, and China's quantum technology autonomy process has continued to accelerate.”

• There is still uncertainty about how successful the US alliance building (under the Biden administration) in quantum against China has been—and how enduring, see “superficiality in the US international alliance” in section (4) below.

• The West is not all there is: The article briefly mentions the prospects of quantum communications among BRICS countries, with the example of Russia: “[…] at the end of 2023, China and Russia once again achieved a cross-border ‘full cycle’ quantum communication test.”

Self-harm for the US (backfire effect, 反噬效应):

• Foregone Chinese market for US companies

• Talent shortage in the US: “[the US] restricted normal academic exchanges between the two countries in the name of protecting national security, which may further aggravate the shortage of quantum talents in the United States and hinder the innovative development of quantum technology in the United States.”

  The majority of US PhDs and postdocs in quantum are foreigners and “Following the increasing conservatism of U.S. politics, especially the U.S. government's restrictions on Sino-U.S. cultural and academic exchanges and its 'mistrust' of ethnic Chinese scientists, as well as uncertainties in U.S. immigration policy, these researchers may leave the United States and flow to other countries.”

(4) Three challenges to US leadership

Besides direct backfire effects, the article outlines three challenges to US leadership and its blockade of China in quantum technologies: Funding uncertainty and fragmented “multi-headed” (多头管理) management of quantum in the US, and superficiality in the US international alliance.

1. Funding uncertainty:

   1. Stable and long-term government investment is crucial for quantum technology development: “However, given that U.S. quantum technology development is highly dependent on government financial support, against the backdrop of an economic downturn in the United States and a new Trump administration's demand to cut federal spending, the federal budget may undergo periodic adjustments, which could lead to instability in long-term financial support and affect scientific research and corporate investment decisions.” Very timely statement, seems that it does not even need an economic downturn for massive cuts to the US National Science Foundation (and others). That said, quantum funding, singled out among a few “priority areas,” was proposed to stay roughly constant in the White House budget proposal (which I guess means a decrease factoring in inflation). On that note, I have no idea about the status in US Congress on reauthorizing the National Quantum Initiative Act.

   2. Private funding for quantum in a 2022-2023 “cooling-off period” amidst the AI hype: “global private investment in quantum technology fell by 32% year-on-year in 2022, and fell by 38% in 2023 compared with 2022. Among them, venture capital investment in quantum start-ups in the United States fell sharply by 80% in 2023.” The author argued that it was exactly US government funding that ensured R&D progress despite the downturn.

      By now, this “cooling-off period” seems mostly past, with renewed growth of private VC in 2024. (Although in 2025, this was driven by few but large deals.) Still, the point about uncertainty in private funding is a good one. Downturns could come because of other fields (AI…) that gobble up capital and attention, economic downturns, or a “quantum winter” with slower technical progress than expected. On this front, the US quantum sector would be more strongly affected by any downturn than China, as, relative to China, more leading R&D happens in private companies, many of which rely heavily on private venture capital.

2. Fragmented management:

   “[…] the development of quantum technology in the United States is characterized by multi-headed management (多头管理), which can easily lead to fragmented management problems.” There are multiple coordinating agencies and multiple departments (DoD, DoE, DHS, NIH, NSF, NASA), all of which have their own quantum development and international cooperation activities. “This development model helps promote the development of quantum application technologies in specific fields, but the lack of a unified cross-institutional coordination and cooperation mechanism may lead to problems such as insufficient coordination, duplicate resource allocation, and scattered research directions.” This dispersed approach is quite different from China, where research directions are coordinated more centrally through the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) / the Central Science and Technology Commission (CSTC).

3. Superficiality in the US international alliance:

   1. A superficial cooperation: “[…] the content mainly focuses on the importance of quantum technology and the willingness to promote exchanges and cooperation based on common values.” Mainly dialogues, exchanges and research collaborations, but no clear roadmap. The collaboration is fairly loose, with no concrete mechanisms for technical collaboration, personal exchanges or joint funding plans.

   2. A fundamental conflict of interest: “On the one hand, the United States wants to build a technological encirclement against China through cooperation with its allies, and on the other hand, it has to consider the importance of quantum technology to national security and the goal of maintaining its hegemony in the field of quantum technology. In the process of cooperation, there is a sense of caution and selfishness, which restricts the depth and breadth of cooperation.” I agree. In the EU, for example, technological sovereignty seems a big deal. The lack of big European players in the digital economy is a pain point, and no one wants to repeat the same mistakes for the next quantum revolution. Pair this with a new push to de-risk from America following the Munich Security Conference, and there are strong incentives to keep some limits on cooperation and prioritise local start-ups and capabilities at the cost of “allied scale.”

   3. Coordination among the US and its allies could fracture going forward: “[…] the actual effect of the US export control of key equipment such as chips also depends on whether it can maintain close coordination with key allies. However, the United States and its allies also have a competitive relationship in the field of quantum technology. Against the backdrop of Trump's indiscriminate tariff policy towards allies in his second term and his ‘backstabbing’ of Europe on the Ukraine issue, it remains uncertain whether the US allies can maintain consistency with the US in their stance on the technological blockade against China.” Indeed, the US export controls on quantum computing were “plurilateral”, that is internationally coordinated but amongst an ad hoc group of allies instead of through institutionalized multilateral mechanisms such as the Wassenaar Arrangement (where Russia can veto). This might make it difficult to adjust existing controls or enact new ones without an active US push to coordinate with allies (which, due to the “backstabbing” and tariff issues, might be less receptive than under Biden).

   4. There are no unified quantum standards yet, and different members of the US alliance might adopt different platforms. For example: “[…] many countries in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region have decided to use quantum key distribution (QKD) as the basis of their quantum secure communication strategy. […] However, the United States has chosen ‘post-quantum cryptography’ as a quantum security communication solution, which will restrict future cooperation between the United States and its allies in the field of quantum communications.” I don’t disagree with the argument that different standards / technological choices could hinder collaboration among the US and its allies. However, I would caution that for the example of QKD vs PQC it is not as easy as classifying countries into one of two camps. Most countries emphasise both technologies for quantum-secure communication (even in China, probably the country with the biggest bet on QKD, it is clear that PQC will be needed as well). There was recently a good commentary by Edward Parker on this issue of compatibility in quantum-safe communications between the US and its allies.

(5) My personal take

In my view, the article is a fairly accurate and sober account of US-China competition in quantum. Not much I outright disagree with, I largely share the take on export controls, for example (mix of short-term hindrances and a long-term acceleration). The piece also reaffirmed my view that Chinese America-watchers have a better grasp of America’s quantum ecosystem than most American China-watchers have of China’s (of course, they also have a different information system to work with…).

I commented on many parts directly above. Especially the section on challenges to US quantum leadership is very relevant in my opinion.

Against the backdrop of US budgeting, I feel like I read too many pieces with a narrow focus on China’s supposed “15 billion quantum funding” as the main factor necessitating larger government investments in the US. The article agrees that government funding has been critical to the US’ leading position it is in today. However, regarding challenges to long-term US leadership, rather than discussing the possibility of the US being outspent by China, it focuses more on structural challenges in US quantum funding: stability, long-term outlook, and coordinated resource allocation.

I find the third challenge—“superficiality in the US international alliance”—the most interesting to watch going forward, and likely the most consequential. The coming years could either solidify a US-led Western containment network against China in quantum, or slowly chip away at this Biden-era attempt, giving way to more independent and varied, and possibly more pragmatic, engagement with China in quantum among countries of the “West.”

This newsletter explores quantum tech in China and how it affects, and is affected by, the wider world. Mostly from an S&T innovation policy angle, covering both current events and big questions.

This and most pieces in this newsletter are not technical, but general familiarity with quantum technologies is implicitly assumed. Start with this [1 ] footnote for a short primer on quantum technologies if you are new!

In the following, I introduce some guiding ideas and motivations for this newsletter.

• I argue that English-language discourse on Chinese quantum S&T is lacking (scroll down for some examples of typical misperceptions).

• I introduce my broader view on the competition in quantum technologies, introduce the framing of “access asymmetry”, and argue why the deepening quantum bifurcation is highly concerning.

Why: Quantum in China matters globally, but English-language discourse is lacking

The future transformative potential of quantum technologies is widely recognised, with quantum not just a hot topic for STEM students but also a priority for decision-makers in industry and policy. (This transformative future potential—yet largely unrealised and by no means guaranteed—is assumed here.)

Quantum technologies are subject to intensifying technological competition, framed as key2 to future economic competitiveness and military power.

China plays an important role in the global development of quantum technologies. China leads globally in the deployment of quantum cryptography and has recently undertaken significant initiatives in quantum sensing. China is widely considered behind the US in most quantum computing modalities, although for some, this view has become more shaky given the comparable performance of Zu Chongzhi No. 3 (by USTC) with the Willow quantum chip (by Google). Furthermore, in metrics such as number of scientific publications, citations or patents, aggregate quantum output in China is often close to or surpassing that of the US. Some of the most famous quantum experiments in recent years, such as the Micius satellite or the world’s second “quantum advantage” quantum computing experiment, were realised by Chinese researchers.

Yet, English language discourse on quantum in China is often lacking, oscillating between hype and sensationalization on one extreme, and disregard on the other. Take the example of patents (figure above), which can be interpreted to show China dominating global patenting (if domestic patents are considered) or lagging far behind the US and Europe (if only patents issued by at least two patent authorities are considered).

English language discourse is often lacking

A recent piece3 in The Wire China highlights the alarmist “quantum panic” frequently found in English reporting of quantum breakthroughs in China. The increasingly securitised view—part of the wider US-China tech competition, through which quantum technologies are seen—incentivises articles that amplify extreme claims, such as related to cryptographic breakthroughs (which often turn out to be misleading) or military applications. Despite my criticism of excessive alarmism, US-China competition in quantum does matter. It could have grave consequences (see “quantum bifurcation” below), necessitating grounded, cool-headed analysis that cuts through the noise. This blog aims to be a platform for serious thoughts and discussions about quantum in China and address popular misperceptions and discrepancies.

Take the following examples of misperceptions or discrepancies that I hope to discuss further at some point:

• “The Chinese government spent 15 billion USD on quantum technologies.” (E.g. here, here, here …) I want to write a separate piece on this at some point. For now, this quote from Olivier Ezratty‘s book also expresses my view on this: “It is tiring to see these unchecked and non-official numbers since China’s government has never communicated in a consistent and consolidated manner about its investments in quantum contrarily to most developed countries. Why are these false numbers circulating broadly in the Western world without being checked?”

• “There is no meaningful quantum industry in China, everything happens top-down in state-directed laboratories.”

  This point is more subtle, as state assets and publicly funded laboratories do indeed play a very important role in China’s development of quantum technologies. However, the focus on government-led labs and top-down planning risks prematurely disregarding other efforts, such as incentives and support measures for private quantum entrepreneurs4. I think this is one of the reasons why the number of quantum companies in China is often significantly underestimated. For example, a 2024 ITIF report on China’s quantum ecosystem concludes that “only around 14 private-sector firms can be identified as making significant contributions to quantum technology.” On the other side, CAICT—an important think tank under the PRC’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology—estimates the number of Chinese quantum companies at 107 in 2024.

• “Chinese quantum research is highly sensitive and deliberately isolated.” See for example this Economist article or the aforementioned ITIF report. The reality is more nuanced. Overall, this author would argue that the Chinese quantum sector is currently less securitised and tightly controlled than in the US. Definitely in the case of academia, where Chinese institutes and conferences still aim to internationalise. Vice versa, Chinese quantum researchers struggle to obtain visas for conferences in the US (and some other Western countries) or face hour-long customs interviews. Official controls on Chinese quantum tech are also relatively modest5, at least in comparison to the US, which established a broad control regime including 32 PRC quantum additions to the entity list, comprehensive and internationally coordinated export controls on quantum computing (Sep 2024), outbound investment controls (Oct 2024) and import screenings. China’s Ministry of Commerce actually officially encourages foreign business cooperation in quantum technologies, and Xi recently highlighted quantum technology among cutting-edge fields in which to “cultivate incremental cooperation” between China and Germany.

  China’s international isolation in the field is at this point of time more a consequence of successful US containment than deliberate Chinese isolation. Are there also Chinese quantum labs and corporations with tightly controlled access? Are quantum strategies and funding guidelines inaccessible to outside analysts? Is civil-military fusion a real thing? Sure, and all are significant. However, this does not mean that China’s overall quantum *strategy* is insular; rather, it combines (sometimes conflicting) efforts of self-reliance and integration into the global S&T ecosystem.

So far, I argued that quantum in China matters and English writing on it has room for improvement — plenty of reason to start a blog on this topic!

But there is more to my motivation, and it is related to the bigger picture in which I see international quantum competition.

The big picture view

Balance an “access asymmetry”

I believe that, in the field of science and more broadly S&TI, the last decades have seen a consistent access asymmetry between China and “the West”: A large flow of young talents from China to the West, some of whom return to China as highly educated graduates, researchers, and industry professionals. Much attention and often reverence are paid by Chinese observers to developments and actors in the West. And of course, there were also many cases of direct technology transfer (sometimes voluntary, sometimes “forced”). This access (and willingness to leverage it) resulted in a significant flow of knowledge and practices from the West to China.

I call this an access asymmetry due to the lack of equivalents in the reverse direction. Western students in China? Dwarfed (I guess 10x+) by Chinese students in the West. Attention to S&TI in China? Oscillating between ridiculing and sensationalising, with too little first-hand analysis.

This access asymmetry long made sense, a natural arbitrage resulting from vast development gaps. It makes less sense today, after China’s development rapidly progressed during the last decades. Indeed, there are some sectors in which the asymmetry likely started to equilibrate, or even reverse already. In industries where Chinese companies expand abroad (e.g. battery plants in Europe) or foreign corporations recognise access to China not just as a source of revenue, but also as a source of technology and best practices (e.g. German car makers).

In the field of quantum technology, this access asymmetry is likewise obsolete, as leading quantum science and technology is realised in China. Yet, in some ways, it still persists (look at student flows, for example).

The expansion of Western export controls and other technology restrictions and research security measures aimed at China are partly because this access asymmetry was out of touch with the underlying state of capabilities. The dual-use applications and “force-multiplying” potential of quantum technologies furthermore make Western policy makers highly uncomfortable with a continued asymmetry. Controls aim to rebalance by reducing China’s access. I believe that, instead, measures to increase access to China’s S&T ecosystem and allow more symmetric technology diffusion should be more widely considered by Western policymakers.

In this sense, this newsletter hopes to make a small contribution by increasing access to quantum in China through open-source analysis and building bridges between both sides of the Great Firewall.

Why is this important?

The long view: Quantum bifurcation?

In a sense, technological bifurcation, i.e. decoupling into two separate ecosystems—one Western and one Chinese—is already taking shape in commercial quantum technology today. Go to any quantum business event/conference in a Western country, and you are unlikely to find Chinese quantum companies (the reverse for events in China-based venues). Worried about further political intervention and controls, Western quantum companies try to keep “clean” of any Chinese involvement. Even hiring Chinese nationals6 can be a concern, don’t mention business with China-based quantum companies (many of which are on the US entity list anyway). Export controls and outbound investment restrictions keep US capital, hardware and software out of China’s quantum supply chain.

These measures are temporarily slowing down China’s progress, but they also supercharge localisation efforts and diminish foreign participation in and knowledge of China’s quantum developments.

The importance of collaboration for academic quantum science is widely recognised by both the West and China. Yet, even here, joint statements or agreements for international quantum collaboration are limited to a pool of countries closely aligned with the US. Quantum science is still highly international and collaborative, but it is becoming increasingly securitised. Several restrictions now affect quantum research, mostly, but not exclusively, initiated by Western countries with a view to China. These include visa restrictions or long customs interviews, investigations (China Initiative…), approval requirements (e.g. for travel or certain interactions), security screenings (e.g. of incoming students at ETH Zürich), grant scrutiny for foreign collaborators (e.g. DoD, DoE, NIH) and institutional hurdles among a wider trend towards research security. I have done preliminary research7 which shows that the topical composition of quantum research in China and the US has already started to diverge, reversing a longtime trend during which it became more similar. Even academia is feeling pressure to decouple in quantum.

Absent major political shifts, I expect the larger trend of quantum bifurcation into Western and China-dominated ecosystems to continue and become more entrenched over time.

Maybe, this expectation of bifurcation is too simplistic and neglects countries from the Middle East, ASEAN or BRICS that are both willing and able to integrate and bridge both spheres. Maybe, instead of bifurcation, we will see a replay of semiconductors during the Cold War, during which one country leads and the other desperately tries to catch up and imitate.

I would be happy to forego the bifurcation scenario, as I believe the consequences could be grave.

Imagine the following future: A technology, as foundational to information infrastructure as microcontrollers, matures over decades in two separated Innovation Systems. Unlike most other discussions of decoupling, this separation happens at a very early stage of commercialisation (after all, few quantum startups existed prior to 2018, which was also the year the US-China tech competition really started to get going!).

In the resulting bifurcated quantum world…

• What happens after quantum standardisation efforts fail to produce consensus and lead to incompatibilities? Besides economic costs and slower progress, such incompatible standards could increase the likelihood of divergence in the technological paradigm, leading the US and China down different tech trees (think QKD in China and PQC in the US, or quantum computing modality A in China but B in the US).

• How can we responsibly regulate dual-use quantum applications, like advanced cryptography-breaking or artificial design of chemical substances? How to coordinate on non-proliferation and abuse? Think of something like AI safety dialogues, but to establish guardrails on the use of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (with all the havoc it could wreak through its decryption capabilities) instead of advanced AI systems.

• How can we establish trust and safety dialogues if one side achieves a secret, decisive quantum breakthrough? Such an asymmetric capability gap could be highly destabilising, potentially leading to miscalculations or pre-emptive actions among mistrust. This would be exacerbated by limited insight into the developments of the counterparts, few supply-chain interdependencies, and possibly different technological paradigms.

• For Western policy makers: How to maintain insight into China’s quantum ecosystem, and create pathways through which Chinese technical advancements or new directions can be noticed, and diffuse to the Western ecosystem?

Personally, I am worried about such a bifurcated quantum world, which is one reason why I am sceptical of excessive restrictions and securitisation of quantum technology. Rather, I would like to see more measures towards making technology diffusion bidirectional, rather than no diffusion at all.

In any case, if quantum bifurcation is the world we are moving towards, then informed and foresighted decision-making is all the more important. Another reason for this blog (the others were: improving English language discourse on this topic and building bridges).

What: Quantum in China and its interplay with the world

What will be covered in this newsletter?

Everything related to both quantum science and technology innovation and China. How does Chinese quantum S&TI affect, and is affected by, the wider world?

Expect quantum bifurcation (export controls, policy initiatives, international governance) and China’s openness (or lack thereof) to international collaboration in quantum to be recurring areas of interest. I also hope to occasionally write about current events or new developments, and maybe more technical deep dives.

When:

Whenever I find time and inspiration to write something that feels meaningful (feel free to send suggestions).

Hence, there is currently no fixed schedule. Expect fewer than weekly emails. If I am busy, there may be nothing for months. So no spam!

Who:

Elias X. Huber, your humble author; find me on LinkedIn. I will likely be based in Singapore for the foreseeable future. Reach out if you are around!

I come from a theoretical background in quantum information (master’s at ETH Zürich, research on quantum computing algorithms at CQT Singapore), but took the unusual step to follow it up with a 2-year masters in China Studies (Yenching Academy) at Peking University.

I worked in consulting in the past and am always open to discussing interesting ideas or projects (note, however, that I do not accept paid work from government entities).

The China∩Quantum newsletter is currently fully free, will generally reference sources, and attempt to provide reasoning transparency. But, as this is a blog, I express my own biased opinions. I am writing this both as a personal learning opportunity and to constructively inform the English-language discourse on this narrow topic. Let’s see where it goes. Happy to have you along.

Cryogenics are among the main chokepoints that quantum export controls aim at. The recent new restrictions brought to mind an interesting interview I read less than a year ago, shortly after the US added a large number of Chinese quantum companies to the entity list (May 2024): This is a translation of an interview (in 2024) of Chen Jie, a graduate of Zhejiang University who founded CSSC Pride Cryogenic Technology in 2010, on the entity list since May 2024.

Chen Jie was interviewed by Huan Shi from Chip Secrets (芯片揭秘), a weekly column; the original Chinese is here.

This interview gives a glimpse into how US export controls are seen by those directly targeted. It outlines CSSC Pride's path to get there and provides insightful (but simple) technical explanations.

Some notes and memorable quotes

• From nothing to leadership: Hardly any Chinese ultra-low temperature equipment companies existed in 2010, a sector dominated by Japan. Today, according to Chen Jie, CSSC Pride is the second in the world with fully independent intellectual property rights capable of mass-producing G-M cryocoolers. “It signifies that we have broken through the bottlenecks of this entire industry chain from beginning to end, and also broken through the bottlenecks in the design principles. We can achieve independent design, manufacturing, production, including rapid follow-up for some customized needs of downstream customers.”

• Biggest challenge: Getting customers to be willing to try their equipment was the hardest early on. “Actually, the most difficult time was when we first started the business. At that time, the prototype machine was made, but no one, including domestic MRI manufacturers, dared to use it. Because compared to their equipment worth millions, ours was only worth over a hundred thousand. Therefore, without undergoing very high reliability verification, they would definitely not use it in batches. Thus, although we successfully developed it in 2011, it wasn't until 2016 that we started supplying MRI manufacturers in batches.” Still in 2024, Chen Jie appeals in his closing remarks to domestic downstream manufacturers to give upstream suppliers like him more trial opportunities. Here, export controls help, as they force Chinese downstream companies to pivot to domestic suppliers.

• The technology CSSC Pride specializes in: G-M cryocooler (a market of 1.5 billion RMB in 2023), which can “only” cool to -271℃, used for MRI but not cold enough for many quantum technologies. Chen Jie describes how they leveraged mastering G-M cryocoolers as a building block to go to lower temperatures: “After achieving ultra-high vacuum, we can then achieve even lower temperatures based on this cryocooler, for example, a cryocooler that can reach 0.01℃ above absolute zero. At that point, the cryocooler can be used in our quantum science, such as quantum information, quantum computing, etc., and this field happens to be one that the United States is very wary of.”

• Timeline of controls: His account of US export controls on dilution refrigerators is interesting. Talk about leveraging dilution refrigerators as a chokepoint appeared on Reuters already in 2019, but dilution refrigerators were to my knowledge only added to the Commerce Control List in September 2024. According to Chen Jie however, exports were actually already blocked from 2022 onwards: “In 2018, our group approved the establishment of such a project [referring to refrigeration for quantum computing]. At that time, the US could still sell products to us, but by 2022, the US began to prohibit the export of a series of dilution refrigerators used for quantum computing to China, including all related components. We launched our product in 2023, and in April 2024, we were placed on the "Entity List" by the U.S. Department of Commerce.”

• Chen Jie expresses a lot of confidence in their ability to deal with the export controls resulting from the entity listing, and did not seem surprised in the first place:

  • Host: “Many times we call it the Honor Roll [光荣榜 - guāngróng bǎng]. Is the impact of this U.S. measure on your current supply chain significant?”

    Chen Jie: “Actually, we had already made some corresponding preparations in advance.”

    Host: “You anticipated that the U.S. would take such measures, right?”

    Chen Jie: “That's right, because what we are doing would definitely make the Americans wary. Moreover, whether it's the upstream, midstream, or downstream of this industry chain, we are moving faster than the US, so the US is bound to be afraid.”

  • Apparently, applications to quantum computing have already started:

    Host: “It can be said that we have shaken the core competitive sticking point [卡点 - kǎdiǎn] of the China-US tech war. Has the product you have now established a project for already started being applied in quantum computing? Are there successfully delivered machines?”

    Chen Jie: “Yes, there are, and we currently hold quite a few orders because domestic companies can no longer buy these cryocoolers [from the US].”

The Interview

[The following is machine-translated, I do not take any responsibility for accuracy; find the original Chinese here.]

-271℃! How Does a G-M Cryocooler Achieve Ultra-Low Temperatures?

Huan Shi [幻实 - Huàn Shí] (Host): Welcome everyone to Chip Secrets [芯片揭秘 - Xīnpiàn Jiēmì]. I'm Huan Shi. Beside me is Mr. Chen Jie [陈杰 - Chén Jié], Deputy General Manager of CSSC Pride (Nanjing) Cryogenic Technology Co., Ltd. [中船鹏力（南京）超低温技术有限公司 - Zhōng Chuán Péng Lì (Nánjīng) Chāo Dīwēn Jìshù Yǒuxiàn Gōngsī]. Welcome, Director Chen, to Chip Secrets. Some time ago, the U.S. Department of Commerce updated the Entity List again, adding 37 research institutions and companies related to quantum technology to the list, and CSSC Pride (Nanjing) Cryogenic Technology was included among them.

Entity List: Refers to the export control regulations established by the United States to safeguard its national security interests. Before obtaining a license, U.S. exporters are prohibited from helping entities on the list acquire any items subject to these regulations. On May 9, 2024, 37 entities were added to the "Entity List," including 22 Chinese quantum technology research and development institutions added for "acquiring or attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items for the development of quantum technology capabilities." These include the University of Science and Technology of China [中国科学技术大学 - Zhōngguó Kēxué Jìshù Dàxué], Beijing Academy of Quantum Information Sciences [北京量子院 - Běijīng Liàngzǐ Yuàn], CAS Center for Excellence in Quantum Information and Quantum Physics [中科院量子创新院 - Zhōng Kē Yuàn Liàngzǐ Chuàngxīn Yuàn], Institute of Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences [中科院物理所 - Zhōng Kē Yuàn Wùlǐ Suǒ], and several research institutes under the China Electronics Technology Group Corporation [中国电科集团 - Zhōngguó Diànkē Jítuán], encompassing almost all top-tier domestic quantum research institutions.

Regarding this expansion of the Entity List, the reason given by the U.S. Department of Commerce is that our achievements in quantum technology could seriously impact U.S. national security. The reason is as absurd as always [一如既往地离谱 - yī rú jì wǎng de lípǔ], but it's actually not hard to see that China's quantum technology has already posed a certain threat to the United States. So today, I want to chat with Director Chen about what kind of products and technologies are attracting such attention from the U.S.

Chen Jie (Guest): Okay. In 2010, I graduated from Zhejiang University [浙江大学 - Zhèjiāng Dàxué]. At that time, there were almost zero domestic companies making ultra-low temperature equipment. The market was mostly monopolized by Japanese and American equipment, including the G-M cryocoolers we now produce at a rate of a thousand sets per year. This equipment can reach -271℃ and is mainly used for medical MRI. But back then, Japan was the main supplier of low-temperature cryocoolers for MRI.

Huan Shi (Host): Were G-M cryocoolers mostly made by Japan before?

Chen Jie (Guest): That's right, their industrialization development was quite good. I majored in small-scale low-temperature cryocoolers at Zhejiang University. At that time, a good opportunity arose: a leader in our industry led us to establish a company, originally named Nanjing Code Cryogenic Technology Co., Ltd. [南京柯德超低温技术有限公司 - Nánjīng Kē Dé Chāo Dīwēn Jìshù Yǒuxiàn Gōngsī]. Back then, we began to focus on making small low-temperature cryocoolers for MRI. MRI requires liquid helium because the operating temperature of superconducting magnets is 4.2K (-269℃), the temperature of liquid helium at one atmosphere, to achieve a very large magnetic field for clear imaging. Therefore, small low-temperature cryocoolers are crucial equipment; they can prevent liquid helium from evaporating, maintaining a zero-evaporation state 24 hours a day.

G-M Cryocooler: The Gifford-McMahon cycle cryocooler (G-M cryocooler for short), invented by Gifford and McMahon in 1956, is a regenerative cryocooler based on the principle of adiabatic gas expansion. It achieves refrigeration through continuous Simon expansion via valve timing. Its thermodynamic process consists of a cycle comprising two isobaric processes and two isochoric processes. Cryocoolers based on this cycle have advantages such as long operating periods, stable and reliable performance, low vibration, and ease of use, hence they are widely used in satellite communications and other fields.

Huan Shi (Host): Could you tell us about the technical route of your products? How does it achieve low-temperature refrigeration?

Chen Jie (Guest): Our product technology is called the regenerative deep cryogenic refrigeration method. Its principle is different from our ordinary air conditioners. Air conditioning is a forward cycle, whereas our low-temperature cryocooler has both inflow and outflow in one channel. Therefore, we need a regenerator to collect this part of the energy. Each inflow and outflow releases and collects a portion of energy, and the temperature gradually decreases accordingly. The G-M cryocooler was proposed by Gifford and McMahon. This product can reach deep low temperatures, but there is relatively little equipment on the market for civilian applications, so few people know about it.

Huan Shi (Host): The refrigeration methods we usually hear about are solutions like air conditioners and compressors, but your technical route is completely different, right?

Chen Jie (Guest): That's right. Ordinary technical routes cannot achieve such low temperatures.

Huan Shi (Host): In this environment, besides your solution, are there other technical routes?

Chen Jie (Guest): Yes, there are, but our solution is currently the most economical, affordable, structurally simplest, and most reliable one that has been commercialized.

Huan Shi (Host): Could you explain where the cost-effectiveness of this solution is higher than general solutions?

Chen Jie (Guest): In the deep cryogenic field, helium gas is used as the working fluid. We also have a forward cycle refrigeration method, but at that time, the helium refrigeration involved turbine expansion, which had very large cooling capacity and a very complex structure. That method is suitable when, for our Big Science projects [大科学工程 - dà kēxué gōngchéng], a lot of liquid helium and energy needs to be generated.

We have two types of small cryocoolers. One is called the Stirling cryocooler, which is high-frequency and also has an inflow-outflow form, but it can only reach about -250℃. To reach the liquid helium temperature range of -269℃, the frequency needs to be lowered. The G-M cryocooler we are currently making is capable of doing this job.

Stirling Cryocooler: The Stirling refrigerator (also known as ST refrigerator) is an electrically driven mechanical refrigerator. In 1816, O.R. Stirling proposed a thermodynamic cycle consisting of two isothermal processes and two isochoric regenerative processes, known as the Stirling cycle, also called the constant volume regenerative cycle. The reverse of this cycle used for refrigeration is called the reverse Stirling cycle, or Stirling refrigeration cycle, and refrigerators operating on the reverse Stirling cycle are called Stirling refrigerators. Stirling refrigerators come in integral and split types. Stirling refrigerators have advantages such as compact structure, wide operating temperature range, fast startup, high efficiency, and simple operation.

Huan Shi (Host): Are there many domestic peers in this track [赛道 - sàidào]?

Chen Jie (Guest): There are domestic peers who started earlier than us, but none have achieved temperatures as low or efficiency as high as ours. Of course, we also faced numerous difficulties [困难重重 - kùnnán chóngchóng] when we first started, learning from some experiences [借鉴了一些经验 - jièjiànle yīxiē jīngyàn] along the way, and went through continuous R&D iterations. Today, our company is the second in the world with fully independent intellectual property rights globally, capable of mass-producing G-M cryocoolers in the liquid helium temperature range. The first is Sumitomo [住友 - Zhùyǒu] of Japan.

Huan Shi (Host): Japan is indeed outstanding in the field of cryogenic refrigeration. So, from starting the business until now, do you feel there is still a large gap between us and the industry leader?

Chen Jie (Guest): We have moved from initially following and running alongside [跟跑、并跑 - gēnpǎo, bìngpǎo] them, to now having products on the market that surpass theirs. Last year, we released the world's largest 4K G-M cryocooler, capable of achieving a cooling capacity of up to 4 watts at just 4.2K.

Huan Shi (Host): What does this signify?

Chen Jie (Guest): It signifies that we have broken through the bottlenecks of this entire industry chain from beginning to end, and also broken through the bottlenecks in the design principles. We can achieve independent design, manufacturing, production, including rapid follow-up for some customized needs of downstream customers.

Huan Shi (Host): It has indeed been a very difficult journey. When you first started the business, did you ever imagine achieving the success you have today?

Chen Jie (Guest): Actually, when we first started, we only thought about how to do the most basic model of equipment well and successfully use it in batches for MRI.

Leveraging the Core Bottleneck? Cryogenic Refrigeration Powers New Breakthroughs in Quantum Computing!

Huan Shi (Host): After achieving the current progress, will your customer market direction be broader than before? What areas are suitable for adopting your refrigeration mode?

Chen Jie (Guest): Initially, our customer market was oriented towards MRI, and even now, it remains our largest customer application market. Because with this tool, we can "build blocks" [搭积木 - dā jīmù] on this foundation. For example, by making some vacuum chambers, we can supply cryogenic vacuum pumps for semiconductor equipment. This also uses the principle of cryogenic refrigerators to freeze them down to deep low temperatures. After achieving ultra-high vacuum, we can then achieve even lower temperatures based on this cryocooler, for example, a cryocooler that can reach 0.01℃ above absolute zero. At that point, the cryocooler can be used in our quantum science, such as quantum information, quantum computing, etc., and this field happens to be one that the United States is very wary of.

Huan Shi (Host): That's right. I remember many years ago we talked about how quantum computing has extremely high environmental requirements. At that time, everyone was worried about the temperature issue because it was difficult to provide such conditions. I didn't expect to meet a company today that can solve this problem.

Chen Jie (Guest): In 2018, our group approved the establishment of such a project. At that time, the US could still sell products to us, but by 2022, the US began to prohibit the export of a series of dilution refrigerators used for quantum computing to China, including all related components. We launched our product in 2023, and in April 2024, we were placed on the "Entity List" by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Huan Shi (Host): Many times we call it the Honor Roll [光荣榜 - guāngróng bǎng]. Is the impact of this U.S. measure on your current supply chain significant?

Chen Jie (Guest): Actually, we had already made some corresponding preparations in advance.

Huan Shi (Host): You anticipated that the U.S. would take such measures, right?

Chen Jie (Guest): That's right, because what we are doing would definitely make the Americans wary. Moreover, whether it's the upstream, midstream, or downstream of this industry chain, we are moving faster than the US, so the US is bound to be afraid.

Huan Shi (Host): It can be said that we have shaken the core competitive sticking point [卡点 - kǎdiǎn] of the China-US tech war. Has the product you have now established a project for already started being applied in quantum computing? Are there successfully delivered machines?

Chen Jie (Guest): Yes, there are, and we currently hold quite a few orders because domestic companies can no longer buy these cryocoolers [from the US].

Huan Shi (Host): So in this context, it's really remarkable that a Chinese supply chain company can break through the blockade. Will you expand into civilian applications later on?

Chen Jie (Guest): From the beginning of the project, we anticipated that this path would be very difficult. Even wanting to lower the temperature by 0.1℃ might mean no progress for half a year. Starting from 2018, we were stuck for about half a year to a year. There are currently relatively few products for civilian use. The main areas involved are still medical devices and semiconductors. Some scientific instruments we developed have replaced imports. Previously, laboratories were uniformly filled with equipment from developed countries, but now our Chinese equipment is also among them.

Huan Shi (Host): How miniaturized are your G-M cryocooler products? What is their footprint?

Chen Jie (Guest): The height footprint is only about 400-plus millimeters, and the diameter is about 100 millimeters. Its starting temperature state is 300K, while the lowest temperature can reach -271℃.

Huan Shi (Host): If the cryogenic chambers placed in semiconductor equipment are very large, it's also a burden for the factory.

Chen Jie (Guest): Yes, so miniaturization is necessary.

Huan Shi (Host): What is the approximate price range of your products?

Chen Jie (Guest): Approximately between 100,000 and 200,000 [RMB]. The cryocooler for quantum chips is another type; it involves adding other helium-3, helium-4 dilution refrigeration components onto our small cryocooler base to lower the temperature step by step.

Huan Shi (Host): What temperature can the small cryocooler reach?

Chen Jie (Guest): It can reach -271℃. Then, by pumping a vacuum on liquid helium to reduce pressure, it can reach -272℃. Then using helium-3, helium-4, it can reach -273℃, and so on, gradually lowering the temperature.

Huan Shi (Host): It feels like climbing Mount Everest [珠峰 - Zhūfēng]; a 1℃ difference might mean crossing a mountain peak. Previously, when we mentioned low temperatures, we thought of low-temperature superconductivity. Today, it's finally low-temperature engineering.

Chen Jie (Guest): Actually, low-temperature superconductivity also uses many of our products, similar to superconducting maglev, particle accelerators in some Big Science projects, and many superconducting electronic applications, such as single-photon detectors for quantum information, which use superconducting nanowires that need to be cooled down by us. Also, the recently popular controlled nuclear fusion uses high-temperature superconductivity, and our cryogenic equipment can provide an ultra-low temperature environment for this high-temperature superconductor to achieve superconductivity. Although it doesn't involve the civilian level, it is actually closely related.

Huan Shi (Host): What is the price range of your most expensive equipment?

Chen Jie (Guest): The most expensive is a set of equipment costing over twenty million [RMB]. Because different gases have different physical properties, they need to be separated and processed using cryogenic methods. This set of equipment separates neon and helium from the air using cryogenic methods.

Huan Shi (Host): Where is this set of equipment being used now? Are there commercial customers?

Chen Jie (Guest): Yes, like special gases used in semiconductors. For example, lithography machines require neon gas. We provide equipment that can produce neon gas for customers to use. After producing neon gas, gas mixtures are made to be used as the filling gas for the light source inside semiconductor lithography machines.

Is the Future Trend in Ultra-Low Temperature Refrigeration Already Obvious [明牌 - míngpái]?

Huan Shi (Host): So CSSC Pride (Nanjing) Cryogenic Technology not only sells refrigeration equipment but also purification equipment. It feels like the application scenarios are quite rich. Thank you, Director Chen, for sharing so many products and technology application scenarios with us. It makes me feel that China has indeed made very extensive layouts across the entire industry chain. On your entrepreneurial journey so far, could you tell us about the most difficult moment, or the one that remains freshest in your memory [记犹新 - jì yóu xīn]?

Chen Jie (Guest): Actually, the most difficult time was when we first started the business. At that time, the prototype machine was made, but no one, including domestic MRI manufacturers, dared to use it. Because compared to their equipment worth millions, ours was only worth over a hundred thousand. Therefore, without undergoing very high reliability verification, they would definitely not use it in batches. Thus, although we successfully developed it in 2011, it wasn't until 2016 that we started supplying MRI manufacturers in batches.

During those five years in between, we worked on many applications based on cryogenic refrigerators. Since others didn't dare to use them, we used them ourselves. We applied this set of equipment in various scenarios and then delivered them to various downstream manufacturers, simultaneously verifying the reliability of our cryocoolers again. That period was very difficult; we did many things, but the team's technical strength improved very quickly, even though cash flow was tight at that time.

Huan Shi (Host): Because the product hadn't gained full customer acceptance, it was hard to generate significant revenue.

Chen Jie (Guest): Indeed, there is a relatively difficult period before achieving mass production. After gaining everyone's recognition, things became much simpler, and some foreign companies also started approaching us for cooperation.

Huan Shi (Host): That's still very praiseworthy. Could you predict for us what kind of trend the industry will enter in the next 5 to 10 years?

Chen Jie (Guest): Okay. Firstly, in the field of MRI, much of the previous equipment faces upgrades, renovations, or even replacement. Therefore, for the MRI field, the market size will continue to increase in the next 5 to 10 years. So, we still need to refine and strengthen our work in this area, and cooperate with the main equipment manufacturers [主机厂 - zhǔjī chǎng] to make newer, more energy-efficient products with higher reliability and user-friendliness. Secondly, for the semiconductor field, concerning AI computing power, autonomous driving, and various image recognition aspects, I believe at least the Chinese market will definitely continue to expand.

Huan Shi (Host): And now the issue of heat dissipation is receiving more and more attention. I think AI is not just about energy consumption, but also about the problem of heat. This is also an important track we can focus on in the future.

Chen Jie (Guest): I strongly agree with this point. In the future, we will still cooperate with superconductivity because many research institutions are now trying to make superconducting chips. By cooling them to a certain temperature to achieve superconductivity, the energy consumption becomes very low, and very little heat is generated. The future market will continuously expand with the application of superconductivity. Therefore, I believe the field of ultra-low temperatures still has quite significant prospects.

Huan Shi (Host): Finally, is there anything you would like to appeal for publicly?

Chen Jie (Guest): I would like to appeal to the domestic semiconductor industry and medical device manufacturers to give our upstream equipment and component suppliers more trial opportunities, allowing products to be fully verified, thereby achieving iterative upgrades and technological innovation. And to work together with the main equipment manufacturers to make equipment better and superior, providing the latest, most cutting-edge products, even surpassing those from the US and Japan, accelerating the development of our semiconductor and medical device industries.

Huan Shi (Host): Yes, the development of the entire industry definitely requires the upstream and downstream to work together to push forward. After chatting with Director Chen today, I know you have already, at a certain stage, attracted countermeasures from international giants. I believe this is a great success; otherwise, the other party wouldn't treat you as a competitor. We also hope that more people in the industry dare to face such challenges and achieve such self-breakthroughs! Finally, we wish CSSC Pride (Nanjing) Cryogenic Technology increasingly better development.

In the current development of the ultra-low temperature refrigeration field both domestically and internationally, the G-M cryocooler is playing an increasingly important role. With its efficient and stable refrigeration performance, the G-M cryocooler is widely used in research laboratories, medical equipment, semiconductor manufacturing, and other fields. According to relevant reports, the global G-M cryocooler market size was approximately 1.52 billion RMB in 2023. It is projected that from 2023 to 2029, the global G-M cryocooler market will continue to grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 5.9%, reaching a market size of 2.14 billion RMB by 2029. In 2023, China's G-M cryocooler market size was approximately 480 million RMB, accounting for 31.6% of the global market share. Globally, major G-M cryocooler manufacturers include Sumitomo Heavy Industries [住友重工 - Zhùyǒu Zhònggōng] of Japan, Edwards [爱德华 - Àidéhuá] of the UK, Thales Cryogenics of France, Cryomech of the US, Advanced Research Systems of the US, and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation Pengli [中船重工鹏力 - Zhōng Chuán Zhònggōng Péng Lì] of China, among others.

Quantum computers require experiments based on low-temperature environments for superconductors, semiconductors, etc., and the dilution refrigerator is the key core equipment for building superconducting quantum computers, equivalent to a "quantum computing air conditioner" [量子计算空调 - liàngzǐ jìsuàn kōngtiáo], providing an extremely low-temperature operating environment close to absolute zero for superconducting quantum computing chips. In recent years, several of our country's scientific research technologies have achieved major breakthroughs, marking an important step towards the independent and controllable [自主可控 - zìzhǔ kěkòng] development of China's quantum computer technology. However, these achievements have also attracted wariness from the United States. Consequently, the US has repeatedly issued export control regulations against our country. Just on May 9, 2024, the United States updated the "Entity List" again; among the 37 Chinese entities added, 22 are related to quantum computing. This demonstrates that the development of quantum technology holds significant scientific importance and strategic value, and will lead the direction of a new round of technological revolution and industrial transformation. Therefore, technologies in related fields such as cryogenic refrigeration also deserve focused investment.

[End of translation]

This is the third post of maybe many from the China ∩ Quantum Substack. Quantum tech in China; what happens where, how does it affect, and is affected by, international developments? Mostly from an S&T innovation policy angle, future posts may also include technical deepdives.

Different from past quantum additions which included quantum research institutes and downstream start-ups, the new additions focus exclusively on upstream companies in the quantum supply chain, including in cryogenics and optoelectronics. It also adds two distributors in the business of importing, exporting and servicing scientific instruments and specialized components.

Which companies are added and what are they doing?

The following companies were added in connection to quantum technologies:

Cryogenics

• Scikro Instrument (Shanghai/Hong Kong) [赛澔（上海/香港）仪器有限公司]

  • High-tech enterprise in cryogenic technology. Member unit for a standardization plan on “Ultra-low temperature and ultra-low noise system for superconducting quantum computing.”

• Physike Technology [北京飞斯科科技有限公司]

  • High-tech enterprise specializing in cryogenic equipment and test systems.

Opto-electronics and integrated circuits:

• Associated Opto-electronics (Chongqing) [重庆航伟光电科技有限公司]

  • Produces optoelectronic components, primarily laser diodes and photodiodes. These have many applications beyond quantum, and the quantum connection is not clear to me.3

• Chongqing Southwest Integrated Circuit Design [重庆西南集成电路设计有限责任公司]

  • Again the quantum connection is not quite clear to me. May be related to photonic quantum chips, which are among the priorities in the 14th Chongqing S&TI Five-Year plan.

Both have CETC Chip Technology, one of the quantum additions to the entity list in May 2024, as a large shareholder (in addition to other CETC entities).

Distributors and servicing

• Anhui Kehua Sci-Tech Trading [安徽省科华贸易有限责任公司]

  • Sale and service of scientific equipment in China, official distributor in China of AMPTEK (a US high-tech company in nuclear instrumentation). Has supplied USTC and worked with QuantumCTek, both entities listed for their efforts in quantum technology.

• ORICAS Import and Export (Beijing) Corporation [东方科仪控股集团有限公司]

  • Import, export and service for scientific research institutes. The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is a main shareholder (indirect).

Why? Cryogenics and other upstream components as a chokepoint

According to BIS, all seven entities “are added for acquiring and attempting to acquire U.S.-origin items in support of advancing China’s quantum technology capabilities, which has serious ramifications for U.S. national security given the military applications of quantum technologies.” More details are given for Scikro, which is alleged to “have a history of supplying dilution refrigerators, which can be used to significantly improve the cooling capabilities of quantum systems, to Chinese parties on the Entity List as well as defense-related Chinese entities.”

Cryogenics, in particular dilution refrigerators, have for a while been considered a “good chokepoint” due to their importance for many (but not all) quantum technologies, which require cooling to near absolute zero. Talk about restricting the export of dilution refrigerators to China surfaced as early as 2019, but the technology was only added to the Commerce Control List in September 2024 (among broad, internationally coordinated export controls on quantum computing). I am doubtful about how effective these restrictions will be, my impression is that quantum researchers in China are generally optimistic that dilution refrigerators will soon be fully localized; media statements often claim this has already happened, for example with the ez-Q fridge by QuantumCTek or SL1000 by OriginQuantum. (I will post a feature translation on the efforts of another cryogenics company, CSSC Pengli Ultracold Technology, soon.)

Beyond just cryogenics, the emphasis on upstream components of the entity list additions is notable. The previous two rounds of entity listings mostly added quantum research institutes and leading full-stack quantum companies (QuantumCTek and OriginQuantum). Some component and instrumentation producers were also added in May 2024, most of them SOEs. The latest additions seem to double down on components and instrumentation, with all seven listed companies connected to enabling technologies and no additional quantum research institutes or quantum startups added.

Additionally, listing two distributors on the entity list is (as far as I know) a first for quantum technology restrictions. Some of these “middlemen” had business relationships with previously listed entities, possibly enabling them to circumvent restrictions, although there is no evidence for this that I am aware of. Their listing could impact the ability of other companies and researchers to acquire components and to service previously bought equipment, including outside of quantum technologies: For example, ORICAS has also supplied equipment to a variety of medical institutes.

Fazit

I don’t think these new quantum additions to the entity list will change much. They appear targeted to tighten existing restrictions on cryogenics and list upstream companies connected to previously listed entities. None of the younger quantum start-ups further downstream was listed. Furthermore, the most important quantum research institutes and companies have already been on the entity list since May 2024. Comprehensive international export controls by the US (November 2024) and others on quantum computing and related components apply to all of China. There is only so much more pain that can be inflicted with additional restrictions.

As I have argued before, existing US controls on quantum technologies are significant, but I doubt that they will contribute much in the long run to their stated goal of maintaining US leadership, and may even be counter-productive.4

To me, the most significant development here is the addition of distributors to the entity list, which could have ramifications beyond quantum technologies.

This is the second post of maybe many from the China ∩ Quantum Substack. Quantum tech in China; what happens where, how does it affect, and is affected by, international developments? Mostly from an S&T innovation policy angle, future posts may also include technical deepdives.

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